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I. INTRODUCTION
Less than a month before the 2004 presidential election, newspapers
reported that Sinclair Broadcasting Group would require its 62 broadcast
stations to air Stolen Honor, a documentary attacking Democratic presi-
dential candidate John Kerry. Critics accused Sinclair of attempting to
curry favor with George W. Bush's administration and of supporting
Bush's candidacy because he was more likely to loosen media ownership
rules constraining Sinclair's business plans to acquire more broadcast
stations. A few other media outlets criticized Sinclair's decision, though
mildly. The Federal Communications Commission and Federal Elections
Commission refused to take action.
But thousands of unaffiliated individuals loosely coordinated a re-
sponse. They did not use or form a legal entity, but worked collectively
and independently through focal points at several internet websites. They
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agreed Sinclair's actions were wrong, maybe illegal, and that the FCC
and FEC were failing their legal duties. So they proposed and imple-
mented rules relying on economic incentives and disincentives to change
Sinclair's behavior. They organized challenges to Sinclair's broadcast
licenses, pressured Sinclair's largest institutional investors, flooded in-
vestor bulletin boards to undermine Sinclair's stock price, tipped online
surveys against Sinclair's actions, contacted the FCC, circulated and
signed petitions, wrote and called Sinclair, helped initiate a derivative
suit for shareholders, and-in less than two business days-implemented
a nationwide boycott of Sinclair's advertisers in 39 local broadcast mar-
kets. The campaign worked. Sinclair did not air Stolen Honor. It aired a
much more balanced show on Kerry's Vietnam record.
Then the campaign dissolved.
This campaign, which users of weblogs call a blogstorm, is an ex-
ample of an emerging form of collective ad hoc private regulation made
possible by cheap communication technology. Blogs include a diverse
range of easily updated websites; many are political, operated by indi-
viduals who link to, analyze, and write political stories. Although blogs
were involved against Sinclair, bloggers and blog-users acted as more
than mere "citizen journalists."' Although the blogstorm reflects an im-
portant political phenomenon, namely the relationship between blogs,
the mainstream media, and political action, it also represents a different
political phenomenon.
Because of the economics of online information, thousands who do
not know each other can band together in hours, without previous organ-
izational coordination or any persistent central coordination, to affect
others and conform society to their idea of the social good. This changes
the dynamic of political action and the ability of unaffiliated, lone indi-
viduals to respond to social acts where government and the market have
not. Through ad hoc volunteerism, the Sinclair participants produced
regulatory action against a private party with whom they were not trans-
acting-because they believed government failed to do so. Although ad
hoc volunteerism has received sustained attention as a mode of economic
production of information, it has received little attention as a mode of pri-
vate regulation or a cure for government failure.' By "private regulation," I
I. See, e.g., Andrew Kantor, Sinclair Is the Latest to Feel the Power of Blogs, USA
TODAY, Oct. 29, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/andrewkantor/2004-10-29-
kantorx.htm (interpreting the Sinclair blogstorm as merely another instance of bloggers act-
ing as journalists).
2. Its most famous example is the creation of Linux operating system and other open
source software, like the Firefox browser. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and
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mean actions by private actors which deliberately constrain and influ-
ence other private actors. Although private regulation is common, often
including boycotts, scholars predicted that cheap speech through the
internet would weaken, not strengthen, the power of "private speech
regulations."3
Before the internet, such speech regulators consisted primarily of
traditional advocacy groups,4 which were established non-profit corpora-
tions that responded to media indecency, homosexuality (or anti-
homosexuality), violence, racism, or other issues.5 With the economics
of online collaboration, these regulatory groups can form and dissolve
overnight even when they include thousands of people who have never
met, spoken, or emailed.
The Sinclair episode shows that, in addition to its other effects, the
internet can permit unaffiliated citizens to work together instantly to re-
spond to perceived legal or ethical norms-violations when government
does not. With Sinclair, although the participants used some existing pri-
vate regulatory tools, like an advertiser boycott, to perform an existing
activity, private regulation, the internet transformed the use and nature of
these tools and the activity. It did so by lowering the costs of organiza-
tion to permit unaffiliated volunteers to perform actions that usually had
required some level of government-or at least a centralized authority or
preexisting institution of some sort. That is, the internet creates means
for non-institutionalized actors to engage in collective action without an
existing organization and to do so faster and potentially more effectively.
The internet, therefore, can increase the power of private regulation by
providing such regulation with new, efficient organizational forms, and
by including those not already acting within an organization.
Private regulation through blogstorms, whatever their shape or tar-
get, will become more common. In the weeks following the Sinclair
campaign, groups on both the left and right proposed or started dozens
of ad hoc campaigns to regulate "liberal" or "conservative" media
The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002), available at www.benkler.org/
CoasesPenguin.html [hereinafter Benkler, Linux]; Randall Stross, The Fox Is in Microsoft's
Henhouse (and Salivating), N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, § 3, at 5.
3. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1836-
37 (1995) (predicting "private speech regulations will remain only where there must be inter-
mediaries who select what gets distributed").
4. As I argue below, broadly conceived, such private regulators include media compa-
nies themselves.
5. See, e.g., Frank Rich, The Great Indecency Hoax, N.Y Tt Es, Nov. 28, 2004, § 2, at 1.
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companies,6 car companies seen as too gay-friendly,7 professors consid-
ered ultraliberal by conservatives,' and companies based on party
affiliation.9 Other campaigns aimed not to deter but to subsidize; they
allocated specific products to chosen groups (like soldiers) based on so-
cial policy. '° This ad hoc, flash regulation can be as powerful and
effective as established nongovernmental and governmental bodies in
enacting reforms and can potentially support far more active participa-
tion. It will transform political action by enabling powerful new
collective actions, even those based on diffuse harms. It enables innova-
tive individual and group speech forms and sudden action to check
governments and markets as a latent shadow government ready to re-
spond instantly. This new regulation, however, has a dark side. While it
provides some with speech and associational power, it can threaten the
power and rights of others. While it enables groups instantly to form and
to take action, it can support groups that can resemble mobs more than
town halls and that can silence others despite the others' speech rights.
This paper analyzes the emerging phenomenon of private regulation
through ad hoc online coalitions where the coalitions believe that mar-
kets and government have failed. It evaluates the underlying collective
action problems and the online cost structures, motivation, and capacity
that permit individuals to overcome these problems. It provides a taxon-
omy of issues and problems in collective action, and how technology
affects these issues and problems. Because the paper's primary case
study is the Sinclair blogstorm, which targeted speech, many of the pa-
per's conclusions are particularly relevant for private speech regulation,
and the paper explicitly considers normative implications of such private
regulation targeting speech.
6. See, e.g., posting of VirginiaDem to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2004/11/16/101735/41 (Nov. 16, 2004,07:17 PDT).
7. See, e.g., Posting of Pamindurham to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/
story/2004/12/25/85023/455 (Dec. 25, 2004, 06:50 PDT).
8. See, e.g., Posting of Cinnamon68 to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/
story/2004/12/12/21505/084 (Dec. 12, 2004, 07:50 PDT).
9. See, e.g., Our Mission and Purpose, BuyBlue.org, http:www.buyblue.org/mission
(last modified July 13, 2005).
10. U.S. Families of Dead Raise 600,000 Dollars for Fallujah Refugees, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 24, 2004, available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/122504Y.shtml;
posting of Richard Gassan to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/12/23/64551/
725 (Dec. 23, 2004, 04:45 PDT).
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II. CASE STUDY: THE SINCLAIR "STUNT"
In this section, I present what the blogstorm participants called the
Sinclair "stunt" "-Sinclair's desire to air Stolen Honor-and the blog-
storm participants' response to it. As a result, I discuss the blogstorm's
players, developments, and regulatory tools.
A. Dramatis Personae
From the blogstorm participants' perspective, there were several key
players.
1. Sinclair
In October 2004, Sinclair owned 62 stations in 39 markets that
reached approximately 24% of all U.S. television households. Its stations
were affiliated with all six networks, 2 and it was the largest owner of
local broadcast stations. 3
To the participants, Sinclair was a conservative media giant. In April,
2004, it preempted a special episode of ABC's Nightline on its ABC af-
filiate stations. The special aired the "names and photographs of the
more than 500 U.S. troops killed in the Iraq war." Sinclair executives
considered it an anti-Bush political statement: "[it] appears to be moti-
vated by a political agenda.' ' 14 The participants, by contrast, considered
Sinclair's preemption to be motivated by a political agenda. Moreover, a
Sinclair vice-president, who also happened to be Sinclair's head-
lobbyist, had a daily "commentary" on all Sinclair stations (apparently
no other company has a similar practice), during which he often criti-
cized John Kerry. 5 The same vice-president went to Iraq "to find good
news stories that [Sinclair executives] said were being overlooked" by
11. Although this term sounds pejorative, I use it both for ease of discussion and be-
cause much of the blog community used this term for Sinclair's intended broadcast of Stolen
Honor. See Sinclair Broadcast Group, DKOSOPEDIA, http://www.dkosopedia.com/index.php/
SinclairBroadcastGroup (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
12. Sinclair Broadcasting Group, Company Profile, http://www.sbgi.net/about/
profile.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (including "20 FOX, 19 WB, 6 UPN, 8 ABC, 3 CBS,
4 NBC affiliates and 2 independent stations").
13. Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 120-
21(2004).
14. McCain Rebukes Sinclair "Nightline" Decision, CNN.CoM, Apr. 30, 2004, http://
www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZTrV/04/29/abc.nightlineL.
15. Posting of Jay Rosen to PressThink, http:/ljournalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/
pressthink/2004/11/16/snclrvision.html (Nov. 16, 2004, 00:24 EDT).
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the "liberal media."'" Sinclair's executives had also made 97% of their
2004 political donations to Republicans, including President Bush.17 Its
stations had aired "fake" news segments prepared by the Bush admini-
stration which praised a Medicare bill Bush had championed. Finally,
the participants accused Sinclair of lobbying Republicans with poten-
tially illegal tactics. 9
The participants believed that Sinclair was airing Stolen Honor in an
attempt to lobby the president. Sinclair sought changes in the media
ownership limits to permit it to own two or more television stations in
mid-sized markets.
2. Makers of Stolen Honor
To the participants, the makers of Stolen Honor were guilty by asso-
ciation. They were affiliated with, among others, the Swiftboat Veterans
for Truth, an anti-Kerry group that had run ads in August, 2004 attacking
John Kerry's Vietnam service. This group had received exposure on the
cable news channels, but many in mainstream newspapers and liberal
blogs considered their stories to be contradictory and inaccurate.2 ' To the
liberal blogosphere, the Swiftboat Veterans were the embodiment of ly-
ing propaganda, and participants often invoked them metaphorically as
16. Howard Kurtz & Frank Ahrens, Family's TV Clout in Bush's Corner: Sinclair Or-
ders 62 Stations to Air Anti-Kerry Film, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25406-20040ct 1 .html.
17. Id.
18. David Sirota et al., The Progress Report, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Apr.
30, 2004, http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.aspc=biJRJ8OVF&b=63020; posting of
Zknower to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/12/113949/43 (Oct. 12, 2004,
08:39 PDT).
19. See Kurtz & Ahrens, supra note 16 ("Sinclair provided Maryland Gov. Robert L.
Ehrlich Jr. the cut-rate use of a luxury helicopter during the Republican's 2002 race. The heli-
copter came from an aviation firm whose sole director was J. Duncan Smith [also a Sinclair
executive]. A year earlier, as a Maryland congressman, Ehrlich sent the FCC a letter urging
action on a Sinclair request to buy a dozen TV stations. An Ehrlich spokesman at the time
called the letter 'garden-variety constituent service' and said the governor's failure to disclose
the helicopter rides was an oversight."); see also Elizabeth Jensen & Waiter F. Roche Jr., Sin-
clair's Growth Matched by Criticism, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al.
20. Sinclair Broadcast Group, DKOSOPEDIA, supra note 12 (discussing the "favors"
Sinclair wanted from the Bush administration). See also Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC,
373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (including Sinclair among the petitioners challenging FCC own-
ership limits); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (challenging
the FCC ownership limits).
21. See, e.g., Republican-funded Group Attacks Kerry's War Record, FACTCHECK.ORG,
Aug. 22, 2004, http://www.factcheck.org/article.aspx?doclD=231; Joe Conason, Republicans'
Dishonorable Charge, SALON.CoM, Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.salon.com/opinion/conason/
2004/08/06/mccain on swift boat veterans/ (referring to John McCain's response).
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such . Stolen Honor's director was also affiliated with Reverend Sun
Myung Moon, owner of the conservative Washington imes.23
3. Blog Communities
As the name suggests, blogs were central to the blogstorm. Blog
communities consist of networks of people,24 tied to each other through
specific interests2' and also to many others through nodes. Nodes are the
highly trafficked points where many readers and bloggers converge:
through them, readers link to and discover other blogs. 26 The distribution
of blog popularity conforms to a power log graph, meaning a few A-list
blogs get the lion's share of blog traffic, and they can serve as nodes."
When the Sinclair blogstorm began, the nodes were naturally a few A-
list blogs that became involved in the Sinclair blogstorm and directed
their considerable traffic.
First, Talking Points Memo, the blog of journalist Joshua Micah
28Marshall, had over 400,000 unique monthly viewers, was liberal-
leaning, and claimed to have an audience of "politicians, journalists, and
other influential decision- and opinion-makers '29 (and likely also stu-
dents, office employees, and others). Unlike many other blogs, it did not
permit anyone other than Marshall to post or to comment on his posts.
22. Joshua Micah Marshall wrote: "I had been thinking about a post that would put in
stark terms what is going on with this Sinclair Broadcasting stunt, . .. [it was like] an hour
long Swift Boat ad.... It isn't like a Swift Boat ad. It actually is a Swift Boat ad." Posting of
Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/003641
(Oct. 11, 2004, 17:19 EDT).
23. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://
www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/003639 (Oct. 11, 2004, 13:49 EDT) [hereinafter Mar-
shall, The limes Today].
24. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION 163 (2002)
(noting a few observers believe that networks with flat governance hierarchies and distributed
power may emerge as the "newest major social form, after tribes, hierarchies, and markets").
25. See, e.g., Barry Well & Milena Gulia, Virtual Communities as Communities, in
COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 167, 171 (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollack eds., 1999) [herein-
after COMMUNITIES] ("Most community ties are specialized and do not form densely knit
clusters of relationships .... [E]xcept for kin and small clusters of friends, most members of a
person's community network do not really know each other.... People do get all kinds of
support from community members but they have to turn to different ones for different kinds of
help."); RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 56-57.
26. Cf Peter Kollock & Marc Smith, Communities in Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES,
supra note 25, at 3, 17-18 (noting that community is now often mapped in network-
structures).
27. Clay Shirky: Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality, http://www.shirky.coml
writings/powerlawweblog.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
28. Talking Points Memo, Advertise, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/




As a result, it did not spark an open debate among participants, and Mar-
shall had to solicit responses through users' email.
Second, Daily Kos, owned by Markos Moulitsas Ztiniga, a thirty-
something technology lawyer who served in the United States Army be-
fore attending college, was one of the blogosphere's most highly
trafficked and linked sites.30 Unlike Talking Points Memo, Daily Kos was
a "multilayered community engineered to reward ideas that bubble up
from below," and Moulitsas permitted users to post comments to his
posts (and to others' posts) and to set up their own "diaries," which were
"blogs within his blog." The site also permitted peer accreditation,
"where members rank[ed] each other's entries and comments," and user
diaries ended up on the recommended list or, perhaps, on the main
31page.
Third, former economist Duncan Black, known in the blog commu-
nity as Atrios, had a popular blog called Eschaton, which pushed the
blogstorm from the beginning. Like Daily Kos, it provided a space for
comments, but it provided neither space for diaries nor peer accreditation
of comments.
Other top liberal blogs posted and discussed the stunt during the
campaign.33 These included the blog associated with Howard Dean's or-
ganization to elect Democrats to local office, 34 as well as MyDD.com, a
mostly political blog, 5 where Moulitsas began blogging.36
30. Daily Kos, About, http://www.dailykos.com/special/about (last visited Nov. 15,
2005). Moulitsas claims that his blog is not necessarily liberal, but is decidedly partisan for
Democrats on the right and left; some commenters disagreed. Posting of Kos to Daily Kos,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/11/15/212411/47 (Nov. 15, 2004, 19:24 PDT).
31. Micah L. Sifry, The Rise of Open-Source Politics, THE NATION, November 22,
2004, at 14, 17-18, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20041122&s=sifry
(The "Kos community has become a very efficient collaboration engine ... for rapid fact-
checking of political statements and news stories, quick dissemination of news of voting ir-
regularities and brainstorming of campaign themes.").
32. Posting of Atrios to Eschaton, http://atrios.blogspot.com/2004/10/sinclair.html (Oct.
9, 2004, 17:56 EDT) [hereinafter Atrios, Sinclair].
33. See, e.g., posting of Kevin Drum to Political Animal, http://www.
washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_10/004901.php (Oct. 12, 2004, 12:49
EDT); Free Press, Stop Sinclair, http://www.freepress.net/sinclair/links.php (last visited Nov.
15, 2005).
34. Posting of Mike Yedinak to Blog For America, http://www.blogforamerica.com/
archives/005375.html (Oct. 20, 2004, 14:08 EDT).
35. Posting by Chris Bowers to MyDD, http://www.mydd.comstory/2004/l0/9/
153537/663 (Oct. 9, 2004, 15:35 EDT).
36. CHRISTIAN CRUMLISH, POWER OF MANY 27 (2004).
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Steve Soto's non-A-list blog was also important. Soto had previously
been a Kos contributor,37 and posted an entry on his blog, The Left
Coaster, that provided many initial ideas on "How to Deal with Sinclair
Broadcast Group's Attempt to Play Kingmaker."38 His blog also provided
a space for comments, where users debated tactics.
In addition to these blogs, many websites took shape the day Sin-
clair's intentions were reported. The most important, BoycottSBG.com,
coordinated the Sinclair advertiser boycott. It "was founded on October
11, 2004 by Nick Davis, a concerned citizen... [a]fter reading an article
in the Los Angeles Times [explaining Sinclair's intentions]." The site
was an immediate focal point, having "over 300,000 unique visitors in
its first week of operation."3 9 It reciprocally linked to other sites develop-
ing blogstorm strategies."0 Other sites created that day were less
influential, but included Sinclair Watch, a project of a nonprofit media-
activism organization called Free Press,4' which helped provide informa-
tion on challenging licenses, such as filing appropriate complaints. 2
Local blogs focused on specific broadcast stations. 3
4. Other Liberal Organizations
Beyond blogs, existing organizations also played roles. Media Mat-
ters For America, a web-based liberal media watchdog group founded
earlier in the election cycle by ex-conservative David Brock, analyzed
mainstream media coverage of the stunt and blogstorm, and underwrote
the eventual derivative lawsuit against Sinclair. 4 Air America Radio, a
37. Posting of Kos to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.net/archives/001709.htm (Feb.
24, 2003, 16:04 PDT).
38. Posting of Steve Soto to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/
002856.php (Oct. 11, 2004, 10:14 EDT).
39. Sinclair Advertiser Boycott, Media Contacts, http://www.boycottsbg.coml
advertisers/press.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Media Contacts].
40. Posting of Nick to Boycott Sinclair Broadcast Group, http://www.boycottsbg.coml
2004/10/stop-sinclair-broadcasting-group.htm (Oct. 11, 2004, 11:43 EDT).
41. Free Press is a current client of the author at the Institute for Public Representation.
This Article contains solely the author's opinion.
42. Sinclair Watch, Homepage, http://www.sinclairwatch.org (last visited Nov. 15,
2005).
43. See, e.g., posting of Skip Graham to Stop Sinclair RDU, http://boycottsbg-ral.
blogspot.com/2004_10_01_boycottsbg-ralarchive.html (Oct. 12, 2004, 13:34 EDT). They did
not add much value, considering the national nature of the stunt, the blog community, and
Sinclair.
44. Media Matters for America Underwrites Sinclair Broadcast Group Shareholder
Demand, MEDIA MATTERS, Oct. 19, 2004, http://mediamatters.org/items/200410190004. See




liberal talk radio channel, posted about the Sinclair stunt on its blog, and
provided concrete suggestions and restatements of other blogs' sugges-
tions. Air America also had Reed Hundt, a former Bill Clinton-appointed
Chairman of the FCC, on its most popular show to discuss the stunt.45
The liberal think-tank, Center For American Progress, provided research,
and published an article on a liberal e-news site.46
There was much less discussion of the blogstorm among right-wing
bloggers. Apparently none attacked the blogstorm itself-just any inti-
mations of government regulation.
B. The Perceived Background: FCC and Mainstream Media
Liberal blog users shared common perceptions about the FCC and
most media companies before the stunt. First, they believed that loosen-
ing the media-ownership rules harmed democracy. They believed that
select media companies would have too much political influence if they
owned the majority of media outlets informing the public. A few days
into the blogstorm, Democratic FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps
reflected their belief, calling the Sinclair stunt "proof positive of media
consolidation run amok.
' 48
Second, the participants believed the media was conservative and bi-
ased against Democrats.4 '9 For example, the blogstorm participants
45. Posting of Rob Mackey to Al Franken Blog, http://www.airamericaradio.com
alfrankenshow/node/1916 (Oct. 12, 2004, 17:43 EDT).
46. Christy Harvey et al., Sinclair Strikes Again, ALTERNET, Oct. 12, 2004, http://
www.alternet.org/story/201 51/.
47. For example, Glenn Reynolds, owner of the popular conservative blog Instapundit,
focused on the response by officials in the Kerry campaign, not unaffiliated individuals. He
suggested that Kerry's campaigners' implicit threats either consisted of or were calling for
government action. He characterized the attempt to stop Sinclair as part of a larger assault on
freedom of speech; he called Kerry's campaign "thuggish" in its response; then he suggested
Sinclair's bias was no different from CBS's. He implicitly approved of the blogstorm's legiti-
macy, likening it to a recent conservative campaign that prevented the broadcast of a movie
allegedly critical of Ronald Reagan: that movie "was stopped by public outcry, not govern-
ment action." Posting of Glenn Reynolds to Instapundit, http://instapundit.com/archives/
018388.php (Oct. 12, 2004, 16:26 EDT).
Andrew Sullivan, owner of The Daily Dish, disagreed with Reynolds, and called Stolen
Honor a smear. Although his instincts were against "any attempt to [governmentally] regulate"
the showing, he considered it troubling and understood why liberals would protest. Posting of
Andrew to The Daily Dish, http://andrewsullivan.com/index.php?dish-inc=archives/2004
10_10_disharchive.html#10976138913630787 (Oct. 12, 2004, 16:43 EDT).
48. David Lieberman, Plan to Air Divisive Film Raises Questions, USA TODAY, Oct.
11, 2003, at Bi, available at http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/money/20041012/lb_
corptax 12.art.htm.
49. Conservative blog-users believed the opposite.
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considered Fox News to air propaganda,5" and considered CNN and
MSNBC also to be anti-Kerry. The Kos community had been following
the comments of even Sumner Redstone, a Democrat, who controls Via-
corn (owner of CBS, MTV, Blockbuster, etc.). Redstone said he
supported President Bush's candidacy because of Bush's media consoli-
dation policies. One blogger said, "Substitute ... any other big media
corporation [who has the same incentive to support Bush's deregulatory
policies] and things get clearer" why the media would prefer Bush." The
users believed that Sinclair's stunt was at least partly motivated by
Sinclair supporting, or further encouraging, Bush's proposed deregula-
tory policies. 2
C. The Story Breaks
On Saturday, October 9, 2004, the Los Angeles Times broke the
story.53 The headline referred to Sinclair as a "Conservative TV Group,"
and the sub-headline noted that "[e]xperts call the move highly unusual."
The article explained that "a number of people privately expressed out-
rage at the seemingly overt nature of the political attack."' 4 That day, a
member of the Daily Kos community said he would purchase a site to
counter Sinclair's actions and would create a petition.5 Atrios's popular
Eschaton blog also mentioned the L.A. Times story.56 A blogger at
MyDD.com pasted part of the story, pointed to the Kos post, encouraged
those in Sinclair markets to call Sinclair, and linked to an advertiser boy-
cott blog he had personally started (which did not become a blogstorm
focus).
57
50. See, e.g., posting of Rimjob to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/1/
25/155253/426 (Jan. 25, 2005, 12:52 PDT) (quoting Ted Turner).
51. Posting of Zgveritas to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.comstory/2004/9/25/
03040/0125 (Sept. 24, 2004, 21:40 PDT).
52. See, e.g., posting of Fyreflye to Daily Kos, http:ldailykos.com/story/2004/10/
11/163831/07 (Oct. 12, 2004, 18:00 PDT).
53. Elizabeth Jensen, Conservative TV Group to Air Anti-Kerry Film, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2004, at Al. Although Sinclair claimed it had never decided to show Stolen Honor as the
"special" program, the participants believed they had evidence proving this false. Sinclair
Broadcast Group, DKOSOPEDIA, supra note 12.
54. Jensen, supra note 53.
55. Posting of Chicagoprogressive to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.comstory/2004/
10/9/122919/659 (Oct. 9, 2004, 21:29 PDT).
56. See, e.g., Atrios, Sinclair, supra note 32.
57. Bowers, supra note 35; see MyDD, About MyDD, http://www.mydd.com/
special/about (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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D. The Blogstorm Begins
Despite the L.A. Times story and blog posts on October 9, activity
did not pick up until Monday morning, October 11, when Steve Soto
posted an entry on his blog about how to take on Sinclair." A-list blogs
pointed to this post. 9 The silence over the weekend may have been be-
cause most participants were not at their computers, or because Soto was
the first to provide a wide range of possible options.
Blogs can do at least five things with news stories. They can break a
story (reporting it first),6° disseminate a story to a specific group,6' flog it
(keeping it alive despite the 24 hours news-cycle), 62 spin it (providing a
58. See Steve Soto, supra note 38.
59. See, e.g., posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://
www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/week _2004_10_10.php (Oct. 11, 2004, 14:03 EDT)
[hereinafter Marshall, Yesterday Former]; posting of Kos to Daily Kos, http:/
www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/11/163831/07 (Oct. 11, 2004, 14:28 PDT) [hereinafter Kos,
Sinclair Advertiser DB Up].
60. Bloggers may have broken the Lewinsky story. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Grossman, The
Press and the Dress, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 34, available at
http://archives.cjr.org/year/98/6/dress.asp. They also may have broken the story of CBS's alleg-
edly fake National Guard memos about President Bush's service. Posting of Jay Rosen to
PressThink, http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2004/11/23/ratherexit.html
(Nov. 23, 2004, 02:17 EDT).
61. Disseminating a story is inherent to many blogs that have specific audiences. See,
e.g., Marshall, The imes Today, supra note 23; Kurtz & Ahrens, supra note 16; Lieberman,
supra note 48; cf CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
Blog users, can also inform others through email or their own blogs. In fact, on October
It and 12, the Post listed an article about the Sinclair stunt as the most emailed article of the
day. This may be partly because of the story's inherent shocking news value and partly be-
cause the participants were recruiting others. See posting of The Other Rasmussen to Daily
Kos, http:llwww.dailykos.conlstory/2004/10/12/121355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 16:06 PDT).
The blogs, emails, and mainstream media so informed citizens that one day into the con-
troversy the websites of Sinclair broadcasters included online polls asking this question: "Do
you think Sinclair Broadcast Group should run the documentary?" Word had spread so far and
wide by Monday, October 11 that visitors to the site knew exactly what "the documentary"
was. Posting of Sparky to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/cgi-bin/mt-
comments.cgi?entryid=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 06:37 EDT).
62. Flogging may affect mainstream journalistic coverage, in part because of news-
cycle timing, especially for television reporters. Television reporters often drop a story after 24
hours unless there is some sort of peg to keep it going, including a reaction from the other
side, a newspaper writing about it, or (now) blogosphere furor for several days. An example of
flogging is when Trent Lott said the country would have been better off had Strom Thurmond
been elected president in 1948. Before the blogs flogged it, reporters had thought Lott's com-
ments were not even newsworthy; it was drowned out by "newsworthy" events, like John
Kerry's allegedly expensive haircut. ESTHER SCOTT, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV'T CASE
STUDY, "BIG MEDIA" MEETS THE "BLOGGERS": COVERAGE OF TRENT LOTT'S REMARKS AT
STROM THURMOND'S BIRTHDAY PARTY 1, 10, 12, 23 (2004), http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
presspol/ResearchPublications/Case_Studies/1731_0.pdf.
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frame for the story),63 and call readers to action. In the Sinclair blog-
storm, blogs and users did not break the story. The blogs disseminated
the story to their readers, kept it alive for weeks, framed it as an instance
of Conservative Big Media flouting the law, and called their readers to
action.
The participants' first reactions were that the stunt was unbelievable
and that it could not be legal. They believed Sinclair violated at least ba-
sic norms of fairness, if not the law.6'
Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt helped convince the participants
that the stunt was an unaddressed legal violation. On the Monday the
blogstorm started, Joshua Marshall posted a letter from Reed Hundt ad-
dressed to Sinclair's executives. The bloggers were not experts in
broadcast and election law, but they relied on experts like Hundt. Hundt
suggested that while Sinclair's actions were not specifically forbidden,
carrying "anti-Kerry propaganda" (or "anti-Bush propaganda") was not
in the public interest. He asked, "[w]hy should a broadcaster keep its
licenses if it behaves in this manner?" 65 Sinclair did not positively re-
spond to this letter.
A day later, Hundt wrote a letter, not to Sinclair, but to Joshua Mar-
shall, which Marshall promptly posted on his blog. Hundt used harsher
terms in this letter. He wrote that it was "important that Sinclair Broad-
casting be urged in all lawful ways that can be imagined to reconsider its
decision." Hundt explained general communications policy, that the elec-
tronic media's role is not to praise the incumbent president, but to aim
for "the goal of balance and faimess."66 He singled out Sinclair's current
acts as almost unique, knowing, violations of these principles: "Sinclair
has a different idea [of the law], and a wrong one in my view.... This is
the law, and it should be honored. 67 Hundt did not mention that although
the Sinclair stunt probably did not legally require equal time for Kerry,
63. As an example, some blog-users, following the 2004 election, tried to spin the dis-
crepancy between the exit poll data and poll results to convince others that the exit polls were
correct. See, e.g., posting of LondonYank to Daily Kos, http:llwww.dailykos.comlstory/2004/
11/3/53438/6175 (Nov. 3, 2004, 02:34 PDT).
64. Although scholars define "norms" in many ways, Amitai Aviram, Regulation By Net-
works, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1179, 1181 n.4 (2003) (and sources cited therein), I use the term
broadly "to include all rules and regularities concerning human conduct," id.
65. Marshall, Yesterday Former, supra note 59 (quoting Reed Hundt).
66. His evidence included "specific provisions relating to rights to buy advertising time,
bans against the gift of advertising time, rights to reply to opponents, and various other
specific means." Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.
talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/003649.php (Oct. 12, 2004, 10:41 EDT) (posting a letter from
Reed Hundt) [hereinafter Reed Hundt, Letter].
67. Id. ("If Sinclair wants to disseminate propaganda, it should buy a printing press, or
create a web site. These other media have no conditions on their publication of points of view.").
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this was largely because of loopholes-Kerry was the candidate "fea-
tured" in Stolen Honor so Bush, not Kerry, could demand response
time.68 Sinclair contended the documentary fit the legal exemption for
news.6 1 Participants agreed with Hundt, however, that Sinclair violated
the spirit of the law, if not the letter, and the law must be "honored," even
if the participants themselves had to enforce it.
Steve Soto observed that online costs permitted new activism to
counter the stunt, even if the government would not. He suggested chal-
lenging Sinclair's license renewals to burden Sinclair with lawyer fees
though he said he had "no illusions that the FCC and Michael Powell
[the Republican-appointed and then-FCC Chairman] may actually reject
some Sinclair licenses over this." He believed the costs of opposing Sin-
clair were manageable because the internet had reduced transaction and
organizational costs:
Sinclair assumes that [license-challenges] would not happen be-
cause a national campaign opposing a major media conglomerate
would cost [Sinclair] opponents way too much. Yet they are not
counting on how cheaply the weblog community, working with
outfits like the Alliance for Better Campaigns, the Center for Digi-
tal Democracy, Take Back the Media, and others that would join
in, could organize the opposition by working with local media law
attorneys who could work pro bono on organizing the license re-
newal opposition campaign, while of course getting some local
and national media coverage themselves.
68. A broadcaster who sells or gives time for a candidate's use must "afford equal oppor-
tunities to all other such candidates for [the same] office in the use of such broadcasting station."
47 U.S.C. § 315 (2000). This is only triggered, however, when the candidate appeared personally,
not his friends or campaign committees.
69. One commentator suggests:
There are at least three doctrines that might apply to this situation. The first is the
"fairness doctrine" of the Federal Communications Commission, which required
broadcasters to grant reply time to those who said their views were criticized. That
rule was killed in 1987. The second are two corollaries of the doctrine--the "personal
attack" rule and the "political editorial" rule-vestiges of the fairness doctrine that
survived a while longer and then died in 2000. The third is the "equal time" law for
political candidates, which still exists but probably doesn't apply to Sinclair because
the candidate featured in the film was Kerry, not Bush [and because Sinclair claims
the special was bona fide news].
Drew Clark, How Fair Is Sinclair's Doctrine?, SLATE.COM, Oct. 20, 2004, http:/I
www.slate.com/id/2108443/.
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I think if the major weblogs start talking about this, it could
happen. 70
BoycottSBG.com was launched on October 11, and its owner helped
organize a database essential for the advertiser boycott.' On the day of
its creation, A-list blogs directed participants to the new database.
Blogs were also providing technical feedback to participants, such as the
73database's compatibility for AOL users.
E. Affecting Sinclair's Behavior-Regulatory Tools
The participants deliberated on their ultimate goal. They did not
want to stifle Stolen Honor entirely. A consensus developed, instead, to
encourage Sinclair to provide "equal time" or "balance" to the opposing
viewpoint. They proposed balance with the Michael Moore documen-
tary, Fahrenheit 9/11, or the pro-Kerry documentary, Going Upriver, but
no consensus emerged.74
With the regulatory goal of equal time, the participants turned to us-
ing "all lawful ways that can be imagined." Commenters posted
thousands of comments on the central blogs, peripheral blogs, and on
lesser read blogs. Moreover, the uncoordinated process led to mass re-
dundancy,75 where participants repeated or pasted others' comments from
the same or other blogs. For ease of discussion 76 1 categorize the discus-
sion based on the different regulatory tools participants discussed or
implemented.
70. Steve Soto, supra note 38.
71. Nick Davis's first post was on October 9 and called for an advertiser boycott. It
received little or no attention. Email from Nick Davis, founder of BoycottSBG.com, to Marvin
Ammori (February 22, 2005, 18:37 EDT) (on file with author) [hereinafter Davis, Email].
72. Moulitsas told his Kos community to "Get to work!" on the database. Kos, Sinclair
Advertiser DB Up, supra note 59; see also posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo,
http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/003643 (Oct. 12, 2004, 05:00 EDT) (directing
readers to the advertiser database).
73. Posting of Kos to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/12/111923/01
(Oct. 12, 2004, 09:19 PDT).
74, See, e.g., posting of Norm to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/cgi-
bin/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 08:16 EDT).
75. Cf Benkler, Linux, supra note 2.
76. Because the blogstorm was so anarchic and redundant, and created so much text, it
would be cumbersome to present a chronological discussion. Cf Marc A. Smith, Invisible





Soto provided a detailed discussion of how to challenge Sinclair's li-
censes.77 Another blog provided similar information, and Joshua
Marshall posted Hundt's letter suggesting Sinclair should not keep its
licenses after such a stunt.
Participant feedback, however, caused the blogstorm largely to
abandon this idea. First, according to commenters who worked in broad-
cast television, licensees are not concerned about losing their licenses
because the standard required to keep a license is so low. Second, most
Sinclair licenses were not up for renewal until after the stunt. Although
challenging the licenses threatened Sinclair with retribution, it would not
stop the stunt.79
2. Boycotting Advertisers
An advertiser boycott quickly emerged as a top optionM A-list blogs
funneled users to BoycottSBG.com, which invited the users to contribute
advertisers to its database. While being constructed, the database pro-
vided the advertisers' names, email addresses, phone numbers, and (with
a pulldown bar) their broadcast market. The site claimed it would verify
the advertiser within 24 hours, but the database was displayed during
creation for participants to contribute, check, use, and provide feedback.
The site used technical advice from users to make the database more
user-friendly. As a result, the database came to permit, with one click,
emailing many advertisers, by broadcast market." Contributors posted
sample emails to send advertisers, while others critiqued and improved
those samples,2 and bloggers posted examples of letters.s3 A Sinclair
77. Steve Soto, supra note 38.
78. Sinclair Watch, supra note 42.
79. See, e.g., posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://
www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/week-2004_l0_10.php (Oct. 11, 2004, 10:00 EDT)
[hereinafter Marshall, A Suggestion from a Reader].
80. Advertiser boycotts have often been used with such traditional regulation: "boycotts
usually try to induce their targets to adopt behavior that the government could have [and
sometimes "should have"] itself mandated." C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOC-
RATIC PRESS 59 (2002).
81. See, e.g., Sinclair Broadcast Group Advertisers, Boycott, http://www.
boycottsbg.com/advertisers/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
82. Posting of TommyG to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/101 1/
63831/07 (Oct. 11, 2004, 19:15 PDT).
83. See, e.g., Sinclair Advertiser Boycott, Sample Letters, http://www.boycottsbg.com/
advertisers/SampleLetters.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
Fall 20051
18 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
employee wrote a letter agreeing with BoycottSBG.com, which the site
posted for moral authority.84
In addition, lawyers volunteered to evaluate the advertisers' con-
tracts. They would confirm the advertisers had the rights to pull
advertising because many local advertisers were small business, appar-
ently without in-house counsel.85 The site gave minimal top-down
directions. For example, it gave suggestions on etiquette: "Please, please,
please be civil to the advertisers and their representatives. 86
As it had weakened the license-challenge strategy, participant feed-
back helped strengthen and tailor the boycott. Broadcast industry
workers argued that advertiser boycotts worked.87 Further, feedback tai-
lored the boycott. The workers suggested that Sinclair's local stations
made most of their money from the 6pm newscasts, so the blogstorm
targeted those newscasts' sponsors.8 The workers also suggested that
local, not national, advertisers were key, and word spread.89 Participants
called on those in Sinclair markets to watch the news, and list all adver-
tisers on the database, including local ones.9 In addition to targeting
newscast sponsors, feedback moved towards more apparent bang for the
buck.9' BoycottSBG.com listed the top ten advertisers by spending.92 A
thirty-year broadcast veteran encouraged participants to "write to the
sales manager-not the general manager"-and to mention the actual
84. See Sinclair Advertiser Boycott, FAQ, Letter Received on 10/21 from an SBG Em-
ployee, http://www.boycottsbg.com/advertisers/sbgemployee.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005)
[hereinafter Nick, Letter Received from SBG Employee].
85. See Sinclair Broadcast Group Advertisers, Boycott, supra note 81.
86. Id.
87. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.coml
archives/week_2004_10_10.php (Oct. 12, 2004, 10:16 EDT) [hereinafter Marshall, From a
Reader].
88. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.
talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/week-2004-10_10.php (Oct. 12, 2004, 17:09 EDT) [herein-
after Marshall, In the Last]. Marshall posted a reader's email, but this reader had apparently
posted the same advice, with minor word discrepancies, on Steve Soto's blog. See
posting of Heynewt to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/cgi-bin/
mt-comments.cgi?entry-id=2856 (Oct. 1I, 2004, 18:15 EDT).
89. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.talking
pointsmemo.com/archives/003655.php (October 12, 2004, 14:20 EDT).
90. Marshall, In the Last, supra note 88.
91. That is, it moved towards the lowest cost-benefit ratio or efficiency. See, e.g., posting
of James on The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.concgi-bin/mt-comments.cgi?
entryid=2856 (Oct. 12, 2004, 16:45 EDT); posting of Kynn123 to Daily Kos http://
www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/11/163831/07 (Oct. 14, 2004, 06:37 PDT) ("Boycott
Against Sinclair Is Too Weak").
92. Sinclair Advertisers, Top 10, http:/www.boycottsbg.com/adveriisersfropTenAdvertisers.
aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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names of the local advertisers they contacted or would contact.93 A co-
menter confirmed the veteran's targeted advice:
[The sales manager] was really concerned when I read him a list
of local [advertisers].... He practically begged me not to, say-
ing 'this involves people's livelihoods.' ... So you are correct.
Local stations-SALES MANAGERS [sic] and local advertisers
AD MANAGERS [sic] are the pressure point.'
Other feedback targeted or corrected activity. Feedback pointed out
companies that were wrongly listed as Sinclair advertisers, or were listed
with wrong phone numbers. Participants also recommended speaking to
specific employees, and provided those employees' names."
The boycott was highly successful. The participants did not even
have to institute a boycott against many of the advertisers, who pulled
out almost immediately based on the credible threats of boycott. Eighty
advertisers pulled out after one week.96 At one point, over 100 advertisers
removed their ads indefinitely.97
3. Attacking Sinclair's Stock Price
Participants had several ideas, some more realistic than others, to at-
tack Sinclair's stock price. First, many listed the names and holdings of
Sinclair's institutional investors. They encouraged participants invested
with those investors to call and request withdrawing from Sinclair
stock.98
93. Marshall, From a Reader, supra note 87.
94. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.
talkingpointsmemo.con/archives/week_2004_10_10.php (Oct. 12, 2004, 11:50 EDT).
95. All of these examples come from one comment, which included ideas typical of
much of the feedback. Posting of Maryscott OConnor to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.coml
story/2004/10/12/121355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 04:23 PDT) (noting a certain company "does not
advertise on Sinclair-according to the very weary woman who asked me if there were a way
to get the phone calls to stop"; noting "CHILI'S-call the 800 number, not the 515 number";
and noting at "PFIZER: Call Ms. Fishman at 212-733-6029"); see also posting of Zic to Daily
Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/21/21355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 15:40 PDT) (dis-
cussing lams Corporation, General Mills, and Great Earth Vitamins); Kos, Sinclair Advertiser
DB Up, supra note 59 (comments).
96. Posting of Nick to Boycott Sinclair Broadcast Group, http://www.boycottsbg.com/
2004/10/advertiser-pullout-update.htm (Oct. 18, 2004, 22:36 EDT).
97. Media Contacts, supra note 39.
98. Posting of Kos to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/11/18560/484
(Oct. 11, 2004, 16:56 PDT). Commenters, not blog-owners, seem to have devised the list. See,
e.g., posting of Debra to Daily Kos, http://www.daykos.com/story/2004/10/11/163831/07
(Oct. 11, 2004, 18:54 PDT) (pasting a comment from the Eschaton blog).
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Second, many proposed calling (especially Democratic) state treas-
urers managing pension investments that invested in Sinclair.99 This had
some success. On October 18, the New York State Comptroller sent a
letter to Sinclair's CEO to "ask about some recent actions that have
brought a great deal of publicity to our company," calling Sinclair "our
company" because New York's retirement and pension fund held
256,600 Sinclair shares. The comptroller asked fifteen pointed questions
based on advertiser boycotts, license challenges, viewers' negative reac-
tion, poor publicity, Sinclair's unequal voting structure, its small number
of independent board members, and the company's poor 2004 perform-
100ance.
Third, many criticized Sinclair's stock on investor electronic bulletin
boards.'' The blogstorm spawned thousands of criticisms on Yahoo! Fi-
nance alone. Its Sinclair bulletin board received over 1,800 messages in
the blogstorm's first two business days, almost 600 more than it had re-
ceived for all previous dates.'02 Those criticizing included proposals, at
times, of a concerted sell-off.' 3
Fourth, some had less practical ideas. Almost all involved billionaire
George Soros, who would publicly short Sinclair stock to drive down the
price, '4 buy all the stock and take over the company,'05 or buy Sinclair's
(very high level of) debt and call it.' Although at least one user argued a
stock buy-out was impossible-because one family largely controlled
99. Posting of Annalivia to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/12/
121355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 16:23 PDT).
100. Letter from Alan G. Hevesi, New York State Comptroller, to David D. Smith, Chief
Executive Officer for Sinclair Broadcast Group (Oct. 18, 2004), available at http://www.
truthout.org/mm_01/4.sinclairletterl0l 804.pdf.
101. See, e.g., posting of Exhausted to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2004/10/11/163831/07 (Oct. 12, 2004, 19:17 PDT); posting of Christian Dem in NC to Daily
Kos, http://www.dailykos.constory/2004/10/12/121355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 15:45 PDT). The
Yahoo! Finance page for Sinclair is at http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=SBGI&d=t.
102. There had previously been 1260. Posting of Skunky Wazoo to Yahoo!
Finance Message Boards: SBGI, http://finance.messages.yahoo.com/bbs?.mm=FN&action=
m&board=7083976&tid=sbgi&sid=7083976&mid=3066 (Oct. 13, 2004, 08:05 EDT). Appar-
ently, most of these messages, recommending "strong sell" and criticizing the company, have
been removed. See Yahoo! Finance Message Boards: SBGI, http://finance.messages.
yahoo.com/bbs?.mm=FN&action=l&board=7083976&tid=sbgi&sid=7083976&mid=1 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005).
103. See, e.g., Christian Dem in NC, supra note 101.
104. Posting of Trifecta to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/11/18560/
484 (Oct. 11, 2004,21:15 PDT).
105. Posting of Debra to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.comcgi-bin/
mt-comments.cgi?entryid=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 12:04 EDT).
106. Posting of Victor Harbison to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/
10/11/18560/484 (Oct. 11, 2004, 20:50 PDT).
[Vol. 12:1
A Shadow Government
Sinclair through unequal rights of different stock classes-some still
held out hope.'07
Feedback also reinforced and targeted these attacks. The participants
followed the stock price and rejoiced at its fall.' °8 On blogs, they posted
mainstream stories noting that Sinclair's stock dropped 12 cents on the
first day of the blogstorm, that Sinclair's stunt "annoyed investors"-
including an investor company with 4% of Sinclair-and that Sinclair
was "barely profitable and laden with debt."'0
Sinclair's shares, which during 2004 had already lost half their
value,"0 declined from Monday, October 11, 2004, when the blogstorm
began, to the day Sinclair was to show Stolen Honor on Friday, October
22. The following chart demonstrates how the stock slid sharply during
the blogstorm, while volume of sales shot up.
TABLE I
Date Open High Low Close Volume
4-Oct-04 7.4 7.64 6.87 7.61 597500
5-Oct-04 7.61 7.7 7.5 7.62 381800
6-Oct-04 7.7 7.88 7.62 7.82 272200
7-Oct-04 7.84 7.84 7.63 7.71 286200
8-Oct-04 7.59 7.76 7.5 7.5 219000
Weekend Before Blogstorm
11-Oct-04t 7.58 7.65 7.37 7.38 587100
12-Oct-04 7.37 7.45 7.24 7.29 425600
13-Oct-04 7.3 7.45 7.14 7.14 451000
14-Oct-04 7.15 7.26 7.1 7.11 350100
15-Oct-04 7.2 7.31 6.98 7.04 428600
Weekend During Blogstorm
18-Oct-04 7.01 7.07 6.37 6.49 1187400
19-Oct-04 6.66 6.67 6.12 6.26 1244500
20-Oct-04 6.5 7.36 6.46 7.05 2545900
107. Posting of Kathy to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.conmcgi-bin/
mt-comments.cgi?entry-id=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 12:13 EDT).
108. See, e.g., posting of Atrios to Eschaton, http://atrios.blogspot.com/2004/10/sinclair-
ceo.html (Oct. 19, 2004, 16:14 EDT).
109. See, e.g., posting of Dontbruisethegin to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.conmstory/
2004/10/12/121355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 16:13 PDT).
110. See Lieberman, supra note 48.
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Date Open High Low Close Volume
21-Oct-04 7.16 7.25 6.94 7.13 1233400
22-Oct-04* 7.24 7.25 7.08 7.17 706600
Weekend After Stunt
25-Oct-04 7.22 7.23 7.03 7.08 282200
26-Oct-04 7.09 7.15 7 7.05 481600
27-Oct-04 7.05 7.14 6.96 7 593900
28-Oct-04 6.9 7.12 6.87 6.99 467000
29-Oct-04 6.99 7.05 6.98 7 385100
Table 1. (f) Date blogstorm began. (*) Date of Sinclair's stunt.
As this shows, after the blogstorm's first weekend, there was a sharp
jump in volume, perhaps because of the major media coverage or the
blogstorm's persistence. Volume almost tripled on the Monday after the
first weekend, and it doubled again that Wednesday, when a lawsuit was
filed and Sinclair announced it would change its program."' The Monday
after the stunt, the volume fell back almost to pre-blogstorm volume, and
the price went slightly back up to pre-blogstorm levels. But weeks after
the blogstorm, it was down again 20% from its pre-blogstorm price."
2
Significantly, between October 9 and October 18, even before the deriva-
tive law suit, Sinclair's stock fell nearly 13%, eliminating "nearly $90
million in shareholder value,""3 and continued to fall until October 20.
Eventually this drop in stock price helped inspire the derivative law suit.
4. Circulating Petitions
Many organizations circulated petitions, while the participants ap-
peared largely uninterested in them. The Democratic National
Committee promoted a petition;"4 StopSinclair.org, started by an estab-
lished nonprofit, had a petition that was also a pledge to oppose
Sinclair's decision."' Petitions were even presented. On October 15,
111. See PRNewswire, Sinclair Broadcast Group to Air Different Program, Fox CARO-
LINA.COM, Oct. 20, 2004, http://www.foxcarolina.com/Global/story.asp?S=2452736.
112. Posting of Grushka to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/11/19/
151928/62 (Nov. 19, 2004, 13:19 PDT).
113. Media Matters For America Underwrites Sinclair Broadcast Group Shareholder
Demand, supra note 44.
114. DNC: Take Action, Stop the Right-Wing Smears Against John Kerry, http://
www.democrats.org/action/200410120001.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).




StopSinclair.org and a protest crowd presented an interim petition with
80,000 names on it to Sinclair's Baltimore headquarters. Thousands
more subsequently signed the petition."' Participant feedback suggested,
however, petitions would not be enough.
5. Spreading Other Embarrassing Information
In addition to these actions, the participants happily spread any em-
barrassing information they learned about Sinclair executives. They
dredged up the story about a Sinclair executive being arrested with a
prostitute in 1996, noting he was "charged with committing a perverted
sex act in a [moving] company-owned Mercedes." 7 A Baltimore user,
sensing her usefulness to the greater community, offered to find the mug
shots."
8
The participants also spread comments by Sinclair executives that
they considered outrageous. Early in the blogstorm, in an appearance on
CNN, an executive compared other television networks that were not
running the same anti-Kerry documentary to Holocaust-deniers. He also
said that reporting unemployment statistics and deaths in Iraq was pro-
Kerry propaganda."9 Bloggers spread his words mockingly.' 20 They then
gleefully posted a letter from the Anti-Defamation League, which op-
poses anti-Semitism, that condemned the executive's Holocaust-
comment.'
2'
Participants spread other "information," or conjecture, hoping to
substantiate it. A user suggested a Sinclair executive was engaged in in-
sider trading, linking to the information for others' scrutiny.' 22 Another
user linked to a story stating that Sinclair owned a military contractor
116. Stop Sinclair Broadcast Group, Latest News, http://www.stopsinclair.org/news.php
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
117. See, e.g., Atrios, Sinclair, supra note 32; posting of Atrios to Eschaton, http://
atrios.blogspot.com/2004/10/calling-all-baltimoreans.html (Oct. 11, 2004, 22:35 EDT). Boy-
cottSBG.com never ran this story. Davis, Email, supra note 71.
118. Posting of Marty to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.conmcgi-bin/
mt-comments.cgi?entry-id=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 16:52 EDT).
119. American Morning (Transcript), CNN.CoM, Oct. 12, 2004, http://transcripts.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/0410/12/Iltm.04.html.
120. Posting of Bink to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/l0/12/84719/
978 (Oct. 12, 2004, 06:47 PDT) (providing updates based on comments and directing users to
Talking Points Memo, as well).
121. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.
con/archives/week_2004_10.10.php (Oct. 12, 2004, 12:16 EDT).
122. Posting of Dingo to Al Franken Blog, http://shows.airamericaradio.com/
alfrankenshow/node/1914 (Oct. 12, 2004, 10:33 EDT).
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that had recently received a military contract, suggesting it was related to
Sinclair broadcasting viewpoints favoring Republicans.'23
Spreading this information did several things, but its effect was pri-
marily internal. First, it reinforced the participants' notion that Sinclair
executives violated social norms in general. They were "bad" people,
and their motives for the stunt could be assumed. Second, correspond-
ingly, it placed the participants on the side of justice. Not only were they
opposing bad guys, but "good" guys like the Anti-Defamation League
were, to some extent, on the same side. There was little feedback, how-
ever, on spreading information as a tool to regulate Sinclair's behavior.
6. Filing Lawsuits
From the first day, users spearheaded the idea of a derivative law-
suit.'24 A derivative lawsuit is one brought by a shareholder against
management for somehow wasting corporate assets.' 2 For example,
Joshua Marshall posted a Texas lawyer's letter explaining the fundamen-
tals of a derivative suit, stating where it could be brought (Maryland,
Sinclair's state of incorporation), and calling for a Maryland lawyer. One
of a derivative suit's advantages, according to a user, was the possibility
of a temporary injunction,2 6 which is an order to do or not do something,
as opposed to merely obtaining a monetary award.
This indicates that the participants believed Sinclair's executives
were violating not only communications and election law, but also cor-
porate and contract law. The executives were breaking obligations to
shareholders, television networks (with whom they had contracts), and
advertisers (who did not bargain for such heat nor to advertise only to
Republicans).
In addition to the derivative suit, there were other legal actions. The
Kerry campaign sent a letter to Sinclair arguing that Sinclair's actions
were illegal under FCC regulations. A photographer sued Stolen Honor's
123. See, e.g., posting of Defoliant to Al Franken Blog, http://airamericaradio.con/
weblogs/sowhatelseisnews/index.php?/franken/comments/1916/ (Oct. 12, 2004, 13:08 EDT).
This story was picked up on the blog for the liberal magazine American Prospect. Posting of
Matthew Yglesias to Tapped, http://www.prospect.org/weblog/archives/2004/10/lindex.html#
004373 (Oct. 12, 2004, 12:10 EDT).
124. See, e.g., posting of Stevie Diaries to Daily Kos, http://abe.dailykos.com/story/
2004/10/11/214450/32 (Oct. 11, 2004, 07:44 PDT).
125. Wasting corporate resources would be an agency cost between the agent (executive)
and principal (shareholder). This argument actually conflicted with the participants' other
argument that a Bush presidency would provide Sinclair with profits because Bush could relax
ownership limits constraining Sinclair.
126. See, e.g., Marshall, A Suggestion from a Reader, supra note 79.
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makers for copyright infringement.'27 Despite blog discussion, the par-
ticipants themselves largely did not implement these legal actions.
7. Other Actions-Taken or Proposed
Commenters suggested filing an FCC or FEC action,'28 finding vol-
unteer lawyers "with connections" to get local injunctions based
somehow on election law, 129 filing suits for false advertising (for calling
the documentary "news"), 3 ° canvassing during the documentary to hand
out leaflets and to discuss the stunt, 3' complaining to the television net-
works (ABC, NBC, WB, or CBS) about being unable to watch the
preempted shows, using public access channels to show counterpoints
(perhaps successful in some areas), "3 organizing a student protest at a
Sinclair station,' 3 working with "well-established" Democratic-leaning
advocacy groups like MoveOn.org (itself young) and unions,'35 and boy-
cotting every Sinclair station during sweeps week to hurt their ratings.
One group formed the blog "Taco Eaters For Truth," with the goal of
boycotting one large advertiser for one hour, including physical picket-
ing outside their stores for that hour, to send a signal.36 Other
participants took to attacking media outlets: a liberal group argued that
CNN was unfairly presenting only Sinclair' side of the controversy."'
127. Sinclair Broadcast Group, DKOSOPEDIA, supra note 12 (listing the FCC regulations
at issue).
128. See, e.g., Posting of Duckman GR to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.
comlcgi-bin/mt-comments.cgi?entry-id=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 10:38 EDT); posting of Carleen
to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/cgi-bin/mt-comments.cgi?entry-id=2856
(Oct. 12, 2004, 14:18 EDT).
129. Posting of Dusty to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.comcgi-bin/mt-
comments.cgi?entry-id=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 12:00 EDT).
130. Posting of Bz to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/cgi-bin/mt-
comments.cgi?entry-id=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 12:09 EDT).
131. Posting of Gogaddy to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/12/
121355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 16:03 PDT).
132. Posting of J Mid to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/11/163831/
07 (Oct. 12, 2004, 17:55 PDT).
133. Press Release, Media Alliance, Area Cable Access Stations to Show "Hijacking
Catastrophe" as Counterpoint to KOVR's Anti-Kerry "News Special" (Oct. 20, 2004), http://
www.media-alliance.org/article.php?story=20041022102556478.
134. Posting of NaomiHart to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/cgi-
bin/mt-comments.cgi?entryjid=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 15:21 EDT). Soto responded with sug-
gestions based on attracting media coverage.
135. See, e.g., James, supra note 91.
136. Boycott KFC/raco Bell for One Hour, http://yumboycott.blogspot.com (last visited
Nov. 15, 2005). This inspired little enthusiasm, perhaps because the advertiser was fairly arbi-
trarily chosen, not based on its particular badness.
137. Media Critic, Heal Thyself, MEDIA MATTERS, Oct. 12, 2004, http://
mediamatters.org/items/200410120009.
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Often, a user had an idea, but asked for feedback on how to implement
the idea, drawing on the community's experience and thought.3 '
Inadvertently, the blogstorm also harmed Sinclair by slowing down
access to its website. This stifled Sinclair's ability to respond through
messages on its website, though Sinclair appeared slow to respond even
without this slowdown.
39
Some users hoped that insiders would work with them, perhaps
overestimating the power of insiders. One user suggested that if one
"courageous station manager would tell Sinclair to take a hike," it would
embolden others and receive enough publicity to stop the stunt.'" This
did not happen, however. Sinclair's news manager in Washington, D.C.
called Sinclair's stunt "indefensible"; Sinclair promptly fired him and
the press promptly covered it.' This seemed not to have much effect,
especially compared to other parts of the blogstorm.
Finally, a few users were reluctant to take action. They feared their
actions could backfire, or that Karl Rove, Bush's campaign architect
whom many Democrats assumed had almost superhuman powers, 142 was
setting a trap for them all: "Are we just doing what Rove wants?'
43
F. Victory
From the time the story broke to the proposed stunt, the blogstorm
could last only two business weeks, from October 11 to October 22. It
effectively lasted only one and a half weeks, and it even appeared to lose
vigor after only its third day.'"
In this brief time, fueled by participant feedback, the blogstorm saw
concrete incremental results. Advertiser pull-outs, especially those of
138. See NaomiHart, supra note 134.
139. Posting of IntemetJunkie to Al Franken Blog, http://airamericaradio.com/weblogs/
sowhatelseisnews/index.php?/franken/comments/1916/ (Oct. 12, 2004, 13:04 EDT).
140. Posting of Peter Jung to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.comcgi-
bin/mt-comments.cgi?entryjd=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 12:27 EDT).
141. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Sinclair Fires Critic of Plan to Broadcast Anti-Kerry Film,
WASH. POST, Oct, 19, 2004, at Cl, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/
articles/A43681-20040ctl8.html ("The Washington bureau chief of Sinclair Broadcast Group
was fired yesterday after accusing the media company of 'indefensible' conduct for planning
to air a movie attacking Sen. John Kerry's Vietnam record in the coming days."); Sinclair
Fires Reporter For Criticizing Anti-Kerry Program, CNN.CoM, Oct. 19, 2004, http://
www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/19/sinclair.kerry/.
142. Maureen Dowd, Desperate Democrats Fixate On Conspiracies, INT'L HERALD
TRIa., Sept. 17, 2004, at 7.
143. Posting of Alan S to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/cgi-bin/
mt-comments.cgi?entry-id=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 18:55 EDT).
144. Kynn123, supra note 91.
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well-recognized advertisers, and stock drops were easily quantifiable
measures of success. On October 20, Burger King announced it would
pull its advertising for the day of the broadcast, the 22nd, and bloggers
celebrated.1
45
On Wednesday, October 19, two days before the stunt and a day after
New York's Comptroller sent his pointed letter, a shareholder action
commenced. A shareholder made a demand at 10 am. Media Matters For
America underwrote the costs of the action, and it paired up with the
institutional investor Glickenhaus & Co., a 43 year-old registered in-
vestment advisor with over $700 million under management and the
owner of 6,100 shares of Sinclair stock. The CEO of Glickenhaus ex-
plained that he was not partisan; he just cared about shareholder value,
and Sinclair's stunt hurt value.' 46
Glickenhaus sent a demand letter to the CEO of Sinclair recounting
some "alarm[ing]" facts: Congresspersons had requested an inquiry,
market analysts downgraded the stock out of fears the licenses may not
be renewed (especially if Bush lost), the stock price had fallen, advertis-
ers had pulled advertising, and Sinclair's reputation was harmed among
both the public and advertisers. The letter also quoted Lehman Brothers,
which had reported that Sinclair "has previously put the interests of
management ahead of the shareholders." The letter asked Sinclair to rec-
tify the situation: should its management persist in airing Stolen Honor,
it had to provide equal access for opposing views, in terms of an equal
time amount and equivalent time of day.14'7 That day, the volume of Sin-
clair's stock purchases and sales doubled from its already high level. The
price continued to fall.'"
Later that same day, Sinclair issued a press release saying it would
not air Stolen Honor but instead would air a special on political media
bias on television and the use of documentaries. The press release sug-
gested Sinclair would accuse other news organizations of partisan bias
(liberal) for not promoting certain anti-Kerry stories.'4 9 Sinclair's lawyer
145. In addition, Al Franken, on liberal Air America Radio, ate a Burger King Whopper
during the show in appreciation. He noted, however, if Burger King had pulled its advertising
from Sinclair indefinitely, he would have said how good the burger tasted on the air. The Al
Franken Show (Air America Radio broadcast Oct. 22, 2004).
146. Media Matters For America Underwrites Sinclair Broadcast Group Shareholder
Demand, supra note 44.
147. Letter from James M. Glickenhaus, partner of Glickenhaus & Co., to David Smith,
Chief Executive Officer for Sinclair Broadcast Group (Oct. 19, 2004), available at http:ll
mediamatters.org/static/pdf/sinclair-demand-letter.pdf.
148. See Table l, supra at 21.
149. See PRNewswire, supra note I 11.
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stated that the blogstorm controversy did not affect Sinclair's decision, 5°
although the participants did not believe this.
Sinclair's statement caused utter confusion in the blogstorm. Although
some in the press considered it "a surprising cave-in,"'' 5' most participants
did not. They read Sinclair's statement not as victory but as deception:
"Put simply, this isn't over.... Sinclair made a largely cosmetic retreat.'
52
A Sinclair employee wrote to BoycottSBG.com with the same mes-
sage,' as did others.' 54
But the blogstorm died almost immediately without any deliberate
coordination.
After the broadcast, the surprised blogosphere claimed near total
victory. BoycottSBG.com announced, "It's Official, We've Won!'' 5  It
praised the blogstorm's collective power: "We changed this program. We
made a difference. We, quite possibly, changed the outcome of this elec-




Some who also declared victory called the blogstorm only one battle
in a larger war against media consolidation.' This larger war was not
immediately taken up. The blogstorm created no permanent institution. 15
150. Frank Ahrens & Howard Kurtz, Anti-Kerry Film Won't Be Aired, WASH. POST, Oct.
20, 2004, at A7, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46338-20040ctl9.html?
nav=mostemailed (" 'We did not and do not make programming decisions because of politi-
cal pressure.' ") (quoting Sinclair's lawyer).
151. Id. (quoting Andrew Schwartzman, of the public interest communications law firm
Media Access Project).
152. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.
con/archives/week_200410.17.php (Oct. 17, 2004, 22:10 EDT); see also Mike Yedinak,
supra note 34; posting of BriVT to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.comlstory/2004/10/19/
185722/64 (Oct. 19, 2004, 16:47 PDT).
153. See Nick, Letter Received from SBG Employee, supra note 84.
154. A Kos diarist wrote, "Sorry for another Sinclair diary ... ok, I'm not. See, almost
everyone is missing the point here. Sinclair has not changed its position one bit." BriVT, supra
note 152.
155. Posting of Nick to Boycott Sinclair Broadcast Group, http://www.boycottsbg.coml
2004/1 0/its-official-weve-won.htm (Oct. 22, 2004, 20:11 EDT).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., posting of Kos to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.comstoryl2004/10/
23/143857/06 (Oct. 23, 2004, 12:38 PDT) [hereinafter Kos, Sinclair].
158. After a few weeks, a minor organization did continue, through existing liberal
groups, leading to at least one advertiser withdrawal. See, e.g., posting of Evan to Alternet,
http://www.alternet.org/mediaculture/2005/01/002799.html (Jan. 5, 2005, 08:29 EDT). Even
this sparked controversy, as that advertiser appeared to deny having withdrawn. See letter from
David Brock, President of Media Matters for America, to Ron Sargent, Chief Executive Offi-
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The owner of BoycottSBG.com, mistaking the short-term burst for long-
term interest, announced a "permanent" "SinclairPatrol." It received al-
most no support. A few days after the relatively balanced show aired, on
November 1, BoycottSBG.com announced that SinclairPatrol's launch
would be delayed, in part because "[T]raffic to this site has hit all new
lows ... [And] [d]onations ... have been equally bad. This reiterates to
me that people are now complacent that Sinclair did not air Stolen
Honor."59
Indeed, the participants did nothing to stop broadcast stations which,
after the stunt, aired Stolen Honor anyway.'16 A conservative group paid
national and local networks, including Pax, to air Stolen Honor several
times a day the weekend right before the election.' 6 Participants as-
sumed that payment made it acceptable; the owner of BoycottSBG.com
equated "legit[imacy]" with legality: "I'm not a lawyer, but since
NewsMax is paying for the time, as long as equal time is made available
for the other side at the same price, then it seems legit."' 62
At the same time, the participants, wherever they were, ignored a
similar move by another company. A California broadcaster, Pappas, an-
nounced it would donate $325,000 of free air time to the Republican
party. This generated almost no blog interest; nobody added a single ad-
vertiser to the Pappas advertising database set up by the owner of
BoycottSBG.com.163 Meanwhile, however, the FCC surprised Pappas by
requiring it to provide equal time to Democrats. Pappas's spokesperson
said the FCC's decision "directly contradicts advice we were given by
cer for Staples, Inc. (Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://sinclairaction.com/press-releases/
4.html.
159. Posting of Nick to Boycott Sinclair Broadcast Group, http://www.boycottsbg.coml
2004/1 1/sinclairpatrol-launch-delayed.htm (Nov. 1, 2004, 10:26 EDT).
160. Posting of Nick to Boycott Sinclair Broadcast Group, http://www.boycottsbg.coml
2004/10/sinclair-airing-stolen-honor.htm (Oct. 31, 10:06 EDT) [hereinafter Nick, Sinclair
Airing Stolen Honor] (assuming it was Sinclair not Pax); see also Elizabeth Dwoskin, Don't
Stop Speaking Out Against Sinclair!, UTNE.COM, Oct. 21, 2004, http://www.utne.coml/
webwatch/2004_171/news/l1415-1.html (encouraging users to continue fighting Sinclair);
Free Press, Stop Sinclair, supra note 33 (including links to continue fighting Sinclair).
161. See DISH Network Air "Stolen Honor," NEWSMAX.COM, Oct. 31, 2004, http:/l
www.newsmax.comjarchives/articles/2004/10/30/193750.shtml.
162. Nick, Sinclair Airing Stolen Honor, supra note 160.
163. Pappas Advertiser Boycott, http://www.boycottsbg.comlpappas/ (last vistited Nov.
13,2005).
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[the] FCC.""' This ruling led participants to believe that perhaps their
previous effort on Sinclair had cast a shadow.
65
After the stunt, Sinclair tried to spin its actions in a positive light. It
claimed its "news special" was hugely profitable, because new advertis-
ers supported it.'6 It cast its special as a commentary on liberal media
bias. Even weeks after the show, its website's initial page prominently
discussed the special and emphasized that all viewpoints were presented
and the Kerry campaign cooperated.' 6 Perhaps understanding the power
that comments to the government regulator could have, it ended: "To
voice your support to the FCC for Sinclair's broadcast of 'A P.O.W.
Story.' Click Here."' 68
I. WHAT KIND OF PRIVATE REGULATION?
The Sinclair episode shows that, in addition to its other effects, the
internet can permit unaffiliated citizens to work together instantly to re-
spond to perceived norms-violations when government does not.1
69
164. Jennifer M. Fitzenberger, FCC Rules in Favor of Equal Airtime, FRESNO BEE, Oct.
30, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.fresnobee.comlocal/story/9356548p-10263362c.
html.
165. Posting of Nick to Boycott Sinclair Broadcast Group, http:lI
www.boycottsbg.comI2004/10/fcc-rules-against-pappas.htm (Oct. 30,2004,09:08 EDT).
166. Michael Learmonth, Sinclair Plots Docs: Broadcaster Planning More Political
Programs, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 5, 2004, at 6, available at http://www.variety.com/
index.asp?layout--upsell-article&articleID=-VRl 1 17913027&categoryID= 14&claims=l.
167. Sinclair Broadcasting, http://www.sbgi.net/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). On No-
vember 10, 2004, the statement read:
We welcome your comments regarding the special news event "A POW Story: Poli-
tics, Pressure and the Media," Sinclair's third news special of 2004. The program
aired on 40 television stations around the country on Friday, October 22, 2004. The
program dealt with a variety of topics including the allegations made by 13 Ameri-
can POWs - including two Medal of Honor winners - about their captivity in North
Vietnam. All viewpoints were included in this documentary.
We would like to thank the Kerry Campaign for its participation during the private
discussions that took place over a period of weeks. Through the recommendations
of senior Kerry Campaign officials, several people closely allied with Senator John
Kerry, including his close friend of 40-years and his co-editor of "The New Sol-
dier," George Butler, participated in the news special.
168. Id.
169. There was still an aspect, of course, of thwarting government. The users blamed
government deregulatory moves (many of which were signed by Bill Clinton) for Sinclair's
power, and believed that Sinclair was attempting to curry favor with the ruling government.
Nonetheless, the blogstorm focused on a private entity and the government's failure to address
the private entity, in the name of fairness, justice, regulation, or public interest.
A Shadow Government
Although the participants used some existing private regulatory tools to
perform an existing activity, the internet transformed the use and nature
of these tools and the activity by lowering the costs of organization. It
permitted unaffiliated volunteers to perform actions that usually had re-
quired some level of government.
A. Acting Self-Consciously as Regulators
Regulation encompasses actions such as the blogstorm. "Regulation"
has many meanings,7 and can cover "almost any external control of
business."'7 Though some use the term to cover instruments of public
law enforced by government, 72 more "[b]roadly speaking," regulation
"includes the creation of norms, detection of violations of those norms,
and enforcement of the norms on the detected violators"' 73 Non-
governmental regulation is common; Lawrence Lessig argues that
"[b]ehavior is regulated by four types of constraint. Law is just one of
those constraints," while the other three are norms, markets, and archi-
tecture. 1 4 Many different parties can regulate, including governments,
trade associations (which, like the National Association of Broadcasters,
can adopt codes of conduct 75), informal regulators (like social net-
works), and the parties themselves (self-regulation).' 76 Much regulation
involves both public and private actors, including industry representa-
tives, "agency regulators, . . . congressional experts[,] ... public interest
groups, citizen advocacy organizations, and even academics.' 77
The blogstorm was an informal regulator, using markets and norms.
It had different tools than social networks of the past, which often relied
merely on word of mouth, gossip, or other information campaigns. 7 8 The
170. STEPHEN G. BREYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 4 (4th ed.
1999).
171. Anthony I. Ogus, Introduction, in REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW ix
(Anthony I. Ogus ed., 2001) [hereinafter REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW].
172. Id.
173. Aviram, supra note 64, at 1180 n. 1.
174. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998),
available at http://www.lessig.org/content/articles/works/LessigNewchicschool.pdf.
175. See, e.g., T. BARTON CARTER ET. AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH
ESTATE 343-44 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing NAB code limitations on advertising).
176. For a discussion of self-regulation and the mass media, see Angela J. Campbell,
Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711 (1999).
177. See LORI A. BRAINARD, TELEVISION: THE LIMITS OF DEREGULATION 6 (2003).
178. Scholars have delineated five types of regulation to enforce transactions, which may
be helpful to consider here. First, first-party regulation is self-regulation, where a party con-
forms its own behavior to norms. Second, second-party regulation is where the parties to a
transaction force each other to conform to norms. Third, government regulation relies on gov-
ernment. Fourth, informal regulators (like social gossip networks) use information and
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participants clearly tried to impose external controls on a business, and
were detecting and punishing norms-violations-including media, elec-
tion, and corporate norms. To succeed, the regulation involved many
parties, including some public officials-like senators and state pension
managers-and private individuals-like citizen journalists, lawyers,
liberal groups, institutional investors, small investors on electronic bulle-
tin boards, and local and national advertisers.
Not only does regulation encompass blogstorm activities, the par-
ticipants consciously considered themselves to be acting as regulators.
They believed they were enforcing actual FCC or FEC regulations. In-
deed, the participants began by petitioning these agencies and turned to
the blogstorm merely as a second-best alternative.
As a result, many of the participants' motivations reflected tradi-
tional regulatory motivations. First, the most usually cited motivation for
traditional regulation is market failure. 79 Market failure is where the free
market "fails" to produce maximum social benefit or to provide certain
socially valuable goods or services. 8° The blogstorm participants were
motivated by perceptions of several common market failures. Foremost
was Sinclair's market power. Competitors' market power can undermine
competition by extracting monopolistic profits, including non-monetary
profits such as political influence.'"' The participants framed Sinclair's
stunt as deriving from media deregulation that permitted too few compa-
nies to control too many outlets and, hence, to have market power. This
was less a researched theory of economic markets than an abstract per-
ception of speech markets. The participants believed Sinclair was
monopolistically extracting political power to augment its ability to
switching mechanisms, spreading information and transacting with others, to help enforce
transactions. Fifth, organizational regulators (like trade associations) rely on information and
switching, as well as exclusion and control mechanisms. See Aviram, supra note 64, at 1190
n.31.
179. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Nobel Prize Lecture: Information and the Change in the
Paradigm in Economics (Dec. 8, 2001), http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2001/
stiglitz-lecture.pdf (discussing how information effects undermine many free market predic-
tions).
180. This can happen when the conditions of a "free market" are absent. See Avery Wie-
ner Katz, Notes, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONoMic APPROACH To LAW 36, 39-40 (Avery
Wiener Katz, ed., 1998) (and sources cited therein) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]; Harold Dem-
setz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, in FOUNDATIONS, 80, 80-81.
181. The conditions that the government imposes on broadcast licensees can be an ex-




lobby for more media deregulation (which would lead eventually to in-
creased profits).'82
A second market failure that often inspires regulation, and inspired
the blogstorm, is inadequate or imperfect information. An individual
may not have enough information to make a decision that would benefit
that individual in a free market. In such situations, regulators may re-
quire private parties to supply information, may supply information
themselves, or may take other actions such as banning a product.' Here,
in part because Sinclair was a media company, the participants believed
that Stolen Honor's consumers would have inadequate information of the
opposing viewpoints. In addition, consumers might lack other informa-
tion the participants considered relevant, such as Sinclair's Republican
connections and the documentary-makers' associations.
A third market failure that influenced the participants centered on
their perception that the Sinclair stunt would create negative external-
ities. One party's action is said (somewhat inaccurately)'" to create an
externality when it affects the well-being of another person with whom
that party is not transacting. The participants believed the Sinclair stunt
would create harmful externalities-misinformed fellow-citizens and a
possible Bush reelection. They saw this as a major harm to them and to
others.
Besides market-failure rationales, other motivations for regulation
were present among the participants. One motivation includes "collective
aspirations." Cass Sunstein explains that people often want quality news-
casts on television even if their own consumption patterns favor sitcoms;
they often favor laws to help the poor even if they do not themselves give
to the poor.'85 With Sinclair's stunt, the participants' (and maybe the
country's) collective aspiration reflected having truthful, unbiased re-
porting-even if many people's consumption patterns favor allegedly
biased discussion, like Fox News or Air America Radio.
The participants determined to regulate Sinclair's behavior not only
because of market failure but also because of government failure. Gov-
ernment failure exists where government action or inaction fails to
provide the most desirable group outcome. Governments fail because of
182. For example, in announcing victory, Moulitsas wrote: "The best part of the Sinclair
boycott ... was clearly illustrating the [market power] dangers of media consolidation." Kos,
Sinclair, supra note 157.
183. See BREYER, supra note 170, at 6-7.
184. See id., at 7 (the "problem (of an externality] results from a large number of acts
and omissions on both sides").
185. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 57-59 (1990).
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officials' incompetence (necessary lack of complete information or abil-
ity) or agency costs (maximizing officials' own self-interest over public's
interest). A commonly cited government failure is "regulatory capture,"
where a public regulator becomes "captured" or controlled by the parties
it nominally regulates. The parties capture government through control-
ling information to the agency (exploiting incompetence) and providing
officials with individual benefits for protecting the parties' interests (ex-
ploiting agency costs--costs resulting from a misalignment of the
incentives of an agent and its principal). 6 The participants turned to the
FCC first, as well as to senators and congressmen.'87 The participants
failed at convincing the FCC or Congress, and were predisposed to believe
the large media companies had already captured the FCC. Since the pub-
lic regulator failed to correct the problem, the participants perceived a
government failure. They turned instead to private regulation.
B. Organizational Differences Between Internet-Enabled Private
Regulation and Traditional Advocacy Regulation
Before the internet, many private groups attempted to police norms-
violations but had different organizational structures than a blogstorm.
The organizations that most closely share the Sinclair blogstorm's goals
are traditional advocacy groups working on media issues, so they pro-
vide the most apt comparison.' Like a blogstorm, many traditional
advocacy groups consider themselves regulatory organizations.89 One
group, the American Family Association (AFA), provides tools on its
website to help individuals get existing community laws enforced.9' A
few weeks after the Sinclair stunt, the AFA pressured 66 ABC affiliates
186. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCd. 3 (1971). The benefit is often a well-paying private lobbying position.
187. The rise of ad hoc lobbying deserves its own discussion in another work. It can
stiffen backbones and change minds. Changes in media have historically resulted in more
participatory lobbying. See DENNIS W. JOHNSON, CONGRESS ONLINE 35, 45, 55, 59 (2004).
For example, talk radio encouraged millions of letters to Congress in 1939, over the repeal of
the 1937 Neutrality Act. Id. at 3.
188. For an excellent study on media-activist groups and their significance, see MILTON
MUELLER ET AL., REINVENTING MEDIA ACTIVISM: PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY IN THE
MAKING OF U.S. COMMUNICATION INFORMATION POLICY, 1960-2002 (2004), http://
dcc.syr.edu/dord/rma/reinventing.pdf.
189. A vast literature addresses the relationship between interest groups and governance.
See, e.g., JEFFERY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUP
(1999); INTEREST GROUP POLITICS (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 5th ed. 1998);
NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN & SHIRLEY ELDER, INTERNET GROUPS, LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING
(1978).
190. See, e.g., Steps to Take to Get Your Community's Laws Enforced, AMERICA FAMILY
FOUNDATION, http://www.afa.net/pomography/stepstoole.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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not to air Saving Private Ryan on primetime,' 9' claiming the AFA was
enforcing indecency regulations. Even after the film's broadcast, the
AFA filed FCC complaints against ABC.'92 Two weeks later, groups tar-
geted ABC's show Desperate Housewives for its alleged indecency.93
Also like a blogstorm, these groups are often effective. The AFA's cam-
paign against Saving Private Ryan was "successful": both Sinclair and
Pappas refused to run the movie, and Pappas described its preemption as
a civic duty.'94
Internet-enabled regulation has obvious organizational differences
with advocacy groups. Advocacy groups rely on hierarchical decision-
making. The AFA has opposed profanity and indecency on television
since 1977. It is incorporated as a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization, and
it has built up expertise and, to some, credibility since the 1970s. Its
leader has been a frequent guest on television, and it has been involved
in a wide-range of campaigns, such as supporting Alabama judge Roy
Moore's refusal to remove the Ten Commandments from his courtroom,
exposing the National Endowment for the Arts's "abuse" of tax dollars,
and pressuring federal prisons into removing porn magazines from their
commissaries.'95 Although the AFA's website has "Action Tools" for ac-
tivism, the group has existed as a nonprofit corporation, and its
organization is top-down. Another group, the Parents Television Council
(PTC), has a million members, and may file a majority of the FCC's
complaints. The PTC understands that "online activism is the future"
and points to activism software like Capwiz, 97 but its campaigns are still
more top-down than the Sinclair blogstorm.
191. See Frank Rich, Bono's New Casualty: "Private Ryan," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004,
§ 2, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com2004/1 1/21/arts/21rich.html.
192. Action Alert: File an indecency complaint against ABC for 'f' word and 's' word,
AMERICA FAMILY FOUNDATION, http://www.afa.net/activism/IssueDetail.asp?id=135 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005).
193. See, e.g., id.
194. Other companies claimed to preempt the movie out of fear, saying "they were afraid
to run the movie because the expletive uttered by Vice President Cheney on the floor of the
Senate back in June is heard many times in the movie." Lisa de Moraes, Where Aired, "Pri-
vate Ryan" Draws a Crowd, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2004, at Cl, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/articles/A46922-2004Nov 12.html.
195. America Family Association, About Us, http://www.afa.net/about.asp (last visited
Nov. 15, 2005).
196. See Parents Television Council in the News, http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/news/
main.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
197. See Capitol Advantage-Online, Capwiz, http://capitoladvantage.com/online.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
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1. Nature of the Firm-Neither Market nor Hierarchy
Unlike traditional advocacy groups, the Sinclair blogstorm was not
organized through markets or hierarchy.'98 In a classic article published
in 1937, Ronald Coase argued that individuals can organize interactions
through the market, with contracts, or through hierarchy.'" He argued
that individuals choose the more profitable organization-that is, all else
equal, the one that minimizes organization costs. Since there are costs to
contracts and to hierarchy, choosing between the two in different situa-
tions is an empirical question. Recently, Yochai Benkler has argued that
the internet permits a third model of production, ad hoc volunteerism,
apparent in producing open source software.' ° The blogstorm took this
form.
The blogstorm participants did not choose organization through the
market. Despite thousands of user suggestions, not one proposed devis-
ing property and contract rights to provide incentives or certainty to
users. Establishing markets would have had far higher costs than poten-
tial benefits-for example, to delineate rights for a secondary market in
the users' excess labor capacity. Instead of writing contracts and negoti-
ating miniscule pay from a nonexistent fund, the users devoted resources
to the immediate tasks of writing sample letters for others to use and
calling advertisers. In addition, proposing property rights likely would
have violated group norms for bloggers, who are generally unpaid except
through tip jars and advertising."'
The participants also did not choose hierarchy. Nobody gave orders,
and nobody took orders. Participants relied on persuasion, not perceived
authority.2° Indeed, participants acknowledged that anyone could per-
suade them, regardless of community status; bloggers like Josh Marshall
invited users to provide expertise. It was through persuasion, not author-
ity, that users joined the blogstorm and chose certain activities within it,
having detenrnined these activities were more worthwhile than, for ex-
ample, reading, posting, or watching football.
198. Although markets, hierarchy, and volunteer collaboration are all present in many
firms, industries, and traditional private-regulatory groups, the blogstorm relied on volunteer
collaboration more than other forms of organization generally do. Whether or not the differ-
ence is in degree or in kind, there is at least a large difference in degree between the blogstorm
and the AFA.
199. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-97 (1937).
200. Benkler, Linux, supra note 2.
201. See DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA 152 (2004).
202. As Howard Rheingold said of the World Wide Web itself, the blog spread "by infec-
tion, not fiat." RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 52.
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In addition, outside the blogstorm, the participants did not turn to
any established, largely hierarchical, organizations for guidance or
commands. Participants largely ignored official responses, either because
they could not or did not want to help with them. They could not help
with some official responses, like the DNC's complaint to the FEC or the
letter from 19 Democratic Senators to the FCC.03 They did not want to
help with the other official responses, feeling their responses would not
be effective. Most of the official groups merely suggested that users con-
tact a powerful person and express disapproval. Air America Radio, for
example, posted some suggestions," including asking Senator John
McCain to criticize Stolen Honor, as he had previously criticized the
Swiftboat Veterans' advertisements and the decision to preempt Night-
line's special.0 5 But the participants were not persuaded that the
Senator's previous criticisms had been effective, that new criticism
would be effective, or that the participants would even be able to encour-
age this possibly ineffective action.26 Air America also suggested
contacting FCC commissioners, based on Hundt's suggestion, though the
participants believed the FCC would not help.0
Not only were the participants unpersuaded about the effectiveness
of official responses, they were unpersuaded these responses best used
all of the participants' capacity.208 The participants could do more than
email a senator. The DNC merely provided a small platform for citizen
action, announcing it would "Stop the Right-Wing Smears Against John
Kerry" by asking users to add their names to an online petition directed
to Sinclair (and likely also the FCC), and announced users could "Do
More" by telling others about the petition only, taking "action" on other
issues, or giving money to the DNC.2 9 The bloggers had far more capacity
than signatures and donations, and they did not feel the signatures effec-
tive. Apparently the DNC's best move was pointing to BoycottSBG.com
203. See Kurtz & Ahrens, supra note 16; Elizabeth Jensen & Stephen Braun, Democrats
Attack Plan for Anti-Kerry Broadcast, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A20; Press Release,
Diane Feinstein, 19 Senators Seek FCC Investigation of Reported Plans by TV Group to Air
Anti-Kerry Film (Oct. 11, 2004), http://feinstein.senate.gov/O4Releases/r-19sinclair.pdf.
204. Rob Mackey, supra note 45.
205. Conason, supra note 21; McCain Rebukes Sinclair "Nightline" Decision, supra
note 14.
206. Posting of Actor212 to Al Franken Blog, http://shows.airamericaradio.coml
alfrankenshow/node/1916#comment (Oct. 12, 2004, 12:52 EDT) (suggesting in rude terms
that McCain lacked the courage to stand up to Bush).
207. See, e.g., Marshall, From a Reader, supra note 87.
208. Kurtz & Ahrens, supra note 16.
209. Take Action, supra note 114.
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without doing more. Because the DNC pointed to the site, mainstream
media outlets considered it to have legitimacy." °
The only authority that may have affected the participants' acts was
Reed Hundt's.'" Hundt's analysis solidified the idea that Sinclair was
violating communications policy, but his analysis was more persuasion
than authority, in long detailed letters by a retired official. In addition, he
did not give specific orders to participants. He suggested pressure on
Sinclair including "all lawful ways that can be imagined," but did not
imagine the ways for the participants."2
Moreover, no official hierarchical organization would have had the
resources to direct the blogstorm through authority. The DNC, for exam-
ple, did not and could not expend the resources to coordinate, through
fiat or market, all the actions the participants eventually took. The costs
would have been far too high for decision-making, identification of tal-
ent, allocation, and coordination." 3
2. Problem of Social Cost-Neither Government nor Bargaining
The participants turned neither to government regulation, nor to pri-
vate bargaining, but to collective private pressure. They perceived
Sinclair to harm them. Parties often benefit or harm those with whom
they are not transacting. This often can make the group, including the
transacting and affected individuals, worse off. For example, individuals
may pollute a common field without compensating or transacting with
214others who use the field, thus harming the others. In the early twenti-
eth-century, the economist A.C. Pigou referred to activities affecting
others as an externality, a kind of market failure, and argued that gov-
ernment regulation is appropriate to correct the externality through taxes
and subsidies.2 5
There are two relevant problems with Pigou's reasoning. First, it ig-
nores government failures. Government can fail to act or can improperly
target taxes and subsidies. Second, Pigou's formulation ignores why the
parties harming one another are not transacting. In another classic arti-
210. Davis, Email, supra note 71.
211. Reed Hundt, Letter, supra note 66.
212. Id.
213. Cf Benkler, Linux, supra note 2, at 410-26.
214. An individual could also provide positive externalities to others with whom she is
not transacting; if the others do not compensate the individual, this harms the group because
the individual has less incentive to create the positive externalities, so they will be underpro-
duced.
215. See Katz, Two Competing Economic Models of Law, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note
180, at 41, 42.
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cle, Ronald Coase argued that government regulation is not a cure-all in
such situations.2 6 Instead, private bargaining provides another method
for dealing with the problems of arranging social affairs. If the costs of
transacting among all affected are low or nonexistent, then the parties
can come together and bargain for the group's best outcome. The costs
of transacting, however, are often high."7 For example, those uncompen-
sated by a common field's pollution would benefit from collective
action; they could come together to reach a bargain with the polluters or
to become a firm with the polluter that manages the field. The costs of
coming together, however, may outweigh the benefit, especially if the
problem involves a large group of people with large costs of transacting,
all with small harms. In such cases, the large group may turn to govern-
ment as an alternative, but government failures mean that government is
not always effective in resolving such problems."8
The Sinclair blogstorm illustrates an alternative to private bargaining
or government intervention likely not envisioned when Coase wrote his
article. The effects of the Sinclair stunt are similar to the harms of an
individual polluting a common field. A blogstorm enables those harmed
to come together instantly to regulate the pollution, without government,
even if they had not been previously organized. Going forward, perhaps,
without any notice, unorganized communities could respond to indus-
tries moving into their areas; unorganized workers could organize across
industry lines or national borders could organize around one issue; or
minorities that are spread across continents could harness their collective
power, and then disband.
3. Collective Action Problems and Blogstorm
Organizational Structure
To regulate Sinclair's behavior, the participants were able to over-
come several perceived or real collective action problems because of the
internet's low transaction costs. The participants did not follow their in-
dependent self-interests but acted in the "larger" group's self-interest.
The larger group could have included the participants, or liberals, or
Democrats, or Americans. Collective action refers to situations where the
216. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1(1960).
217. These would include monetary costs and information asymmetries, as well as cul-
tural or language differences, a grudge, or a family feud.
218. Even "non-regulatory" proposals often require government action. See, e.g., Roger
G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in REGULATION, ECONOMICS,
AND THE LAW, supra note 171, at 41.
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efforts of two or more are necessary to achieve a certain outcome."9 Pre-
dictions about the feasibility of collective action hinge on many
factors.2 Collective action problems happen when collective action is
not possible, often due to the costs of coordination, and uncoordinated,
self-interested actions lead to an undesirable group outcome. With the
blogstorm, the users acted collectively to improve a group outcome, al-
though all of them acting independently would not have had the
incentive or the ability to change Sinclair's behavior.
Sinclair reflected several different perceived or real collective action
problems. First, the blogstorm overcame collective action problems as-
sociated with providing a public good. Providing a public good is a
variant of a problem called prisoner's dilemma. In the usual stylized ex-
ample of this problem, each participant (a prisoner) is individually better
off (a reduced sentence or some other benefit), no matter what the other
participants (co-conspirators) do, performing or not performing the same
action (confessing). But the sum of the individual outcomes would be
highest if none in the group confesses. By performing the uncoordinated,
self-interested acts, the sum of individual benefits would be lower than it
would otherwise be if they could coordinate their actions.'
Producing a public good is a version of the prisoner's dilemma. A
public good is a good that is nonexcludable and nonrival. Nonexcludable
means one cannot exclude others from its benefit; nonrival means a per-
son's consumption of the benefit does not diminish others' benefit.
Common examples include lighthouses, clean air and other environ-
mental goods, and information goods like music and art. As a result of
being nonexcludable and nonrival, providing a public good without
proper coordination suffers from lack of motivation. Someone bears
costs to provide the good but cannot exclude others and reap profits from
those who benefit. Unless the person's benefit to herself outweighs the
costs, she has no incentive to produce the good. Her self-interest is most
served by incurring no costs (not cleaning the air) and free-riding off the
benefit when others create the public good (breathing anyway). Every
member of the group is in this position, so, without coordination, the
group will not create the good and collectively be worse off. With the
blogstorm, participants wanted to "produce" the "public good" of Sin-
clair's balanced television programming or a Kerry election victory. To
219. See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (2004).
220. These include (1) group size, (2) group composition, (3) rules governing player
interaction, (4) strategic nature of interaction (recurring or not), (5) players' information, and
(6) sequence of interactions. Id. at 11.
221. SANDLER, supra note 219, at 23-25.
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them, these were benefits others would have shared, without rivalry or
22exclusion. As a result, each participant had an incentive not to act, and
to free-ride off others, but collective action would have benefited the
223
group.
Second, the Sinclair blogstorm may have appeared to some partici-
pants to have overcome a related collective action problem, called
"chicken." Chicken envisions an impending harm to the whole group
that a subset could deflect-like a coming flood. Unlike providing a
public good, collective inaction leads to loss, not foregoing a benefit.
Collective inaction harms each individual, but private inaction helps the
particular individual. Free-riders would wait until other individuals
"chicken out" to bear the costs, conferring a gain on all members.2 4 If a
blogstorm participant viewed the situation as chicken and not public
222. Peter Kollock, The Economies of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in
Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES, supra note 25, at 220, 223 [hereinafter Kollock, Economies of
Online Cooperation].
223. Another prisoner's dilemma variation is managing common-pool resources. Al-
though this variation is often both created and solved by the internet, the Sinclair blogstorm
did not reflect it. Managing common-pool resources reflects the prisoner's dilemma in a dif-
ferent way. While a public good is a good that is nonexcludable and nonrival, common-pool
resources concerns situations where a good is nonexcludable but at least partially rival. One
example is a common field for a group of cattle ranchers. The field is nonexcludable, but it is
rival to the extent that consumption by some individuals decreases the benefit to others. Each
is better off consuming as much as possible, but if each does so, the group is worse off by
overconsuming the field, rendering it useless. With public goods, each individual is better off
by doing nothing, but with common resources, each is better off by doing something. (For this
distinction, I ignore any philosophical complexities of the omission/commission distinction.
Cf Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
ScL. Q. 470 (1923).) Both acts hurt the group. SANDLER, supra note 219, at 24-27.
The blogstorm did not reflect managing a common resource, and so did not reflect many
of the factors commonly associated with such management, especially how communities use
reputation. Observers have emphasized that online collective action often involves managing
public goods, see RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 35-37, and often involves contributors engag-
ing in a "gift-economy," id. at 172, sanctioning those who do not contribute, id at 131,
recognizing contributors at least through reputation, id. at 46; see also Kollock, supra note
222, at 235, establishing group boundaries that are "well-defined and defended," Kollock,
supra note 222, at 235, maintaining privacy for members, and providing in person meetings
for members, CRUMLISH, supra note 36, at 66-69.
Reputation was conspicuously irrelevant. Individuals are more likely to contribute if their
actions are public, not private, based on reputation. Kollock, supra note 222, at 233. This may
be tied to reciprocity, as observers have noted those with online reputations to help others
more quickly receive help. Id. at 227 (and citations therein). But with the blogstorm, activity
was largely anonymous and private (calls to advertisers, posts on Yahoo! Finance, emails to
Josh Marshall). Nor could the participants develop a reputation for ingenuity, as one could
with developing free software. Most of the blogstorm tasks did not involve ingenuity or skill.
Indeed, the most skillful individual advice was often anonymous, offered by those explaining
merely that they worked in broadcasting and had friends, who could not be named, at Sinclair.
224. SANDLER, supra note 219, at 28-29.
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good, she may have been more likely to contribute for non-rational rea-
sons. Although there is a general social stigma against those who free-
ride,225 free-riding on chicken may appear more immoral than free-riding
on public goods. In addition, individuals are psychologically more moti-
vated to avoid suffering a harm (chicken) than to gain a new benefit
(public good).226 This would suggest individuals are more motivated to
act in the chicken game than the public good scenario.
Third, another collective action problem that the Sinclair participants
overcame is called assurance. In this problem, the contributions of an
individual are wasted unless others also contribute, and then all contribu-
tors (and perhaps non-contributors) benefit. 27 If only two contributions
are needed, one member can lead by contributing, thus putting another in
a position where the other benefits by contributing. In other situations,
many must contribute and incur a cost before they could enjoy a possible
benefit to all. The Sinclair blogstorm could reflect this situation, as indi-
vidual contributions would be wasted without the contributions of many
others. Sinclair blogstorm participants needed to assure others through
their own contributions.
Fourth, another collective action problem arises when redundancy
makes the group worse off. If one individual (or subset) could supply the
entire benefit to the group, there is a problem that many individuals or228
subsets may redundantly incur costs with no additional group benefit.
So Sinclair participants could have determined that others had already
made effective letters to advertisers or that someone else would watch
the local news and input advertisers. They would not want to waste their
efforts. The Sinclair participants had to overcome this problem too; they
did so in part by publicly reporting their actions.
On top of the different forms of problems, a group has to overcome
these problems based in part on the available aggregation mechanisms 2 9
The mechanisms determine how an individual's contribution affects the
total contribution. First, the participants' acts can be summed, where each
individual contribution adds to the whole. Second, the mechanism can be
weighted-sum, where certain contributions are worth more than others.
Both of these aggregation mechanisms were present for blogstorm activi-
ties. Contacting advertisers likely summed, while contributing legal
225. RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 32-33 (and sources cited therein).
226. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psy-
chology of Choice, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 180, at 304.
227. SANDLER, supra note 219, at 26-28.
228. Id. at 28 (calling this a coordination problem).
229. Id. at 60-68.
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advice to advertisers was weighted for lawyers. Third, a collective can
rely on "weakest link" aggregation, where the smallest contribution fixes
the quantity of the public good for all. A usual example is collective se-
curity. An aspect of the blogstorm that had this quality was persuading
advertisers. Participants stressed that callers be polite in calls to advertis-
ers: even one rude participant could have undermined the others' calls.
Fourth, a collective can have best-shot aggregation, where the largest
single provision level equals the level of the public good. With the blog-
storm, broadcast veterans provided the "best-shot" advice on some
strategy decisions.3
C. Ad Hoc Collaboration
Because of low transaction costs on the internet, the Sinclair partici-
pants overcame the collective action problems they faced. Cheap
communication and established communities enabled the participants to
organize and plan quickly and effectively. Cheap communication also
moved participants towards more effective and less costly action through
feedback and sharing."'
1. Cost-Structure
The internet lowers many individual costs. Although the blogstorm
aimed not to produce information but to change a private party's actions,
its cost-structure mirrored those of peer-produced information for two rea-
sons. Peer-produced information is information produced collectively,
without property rights, such as at Wikipedia or with the code for Linux or
Firefox.232 First, the blogstorm similarly relied on a networked computer
environment, human capital, and low communication costs. 233 Second, the
blogstorm peer-produced information as part of its campaign, including
230. An additional component of aggregation is possible. Aggregation can be "thresh-
old," meaning whether acts are summed, weakest-link, or aggregated otherwise, the acts must
meet a threshold level to have an effect. In part, the blogstorm had to meet a threshold or else
the effort would have been wasted, though certain acts did have an independent effect (adver-
tiser pullouts, decreased share price, etc.). See id. at 64-66.
231. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at xviii; id. at 114 (asserting that agriculture, the
alphabet, science, the nation-state, and the telegraph, like the internet, "enlarged the scale of
cooperation").
232. See Benkler, Linux, supra note 2.
233. See id. at 405-06. The Dean campaign's followers similarly developed software in
the process of campaigning for him. See CRUMLISH, supra note 36, at 24, 37-39.
Fall 20051
44 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
regulatory strategy, an advertiser database, Yahoo! Finance and institu-
tional investor information, and news analysis. 3m
The collaborating users could work together because the organiza-
tion as a whole had low information, allocation, collaboration, and
integration costs, and participants had low individual costs.
a. Information Costs
The internet provided low information costs. Participants could re-
ceive and produce high-quality information cheaply. Marginal
production costs were low, as most participants produced information
based on their experience, initial thoughts, responses, or Googling (all
cheap and easy). Marginal distribution costs were also negligible-
clicking on the word "post" or "send" is much less costly than, say, pub-
lishing, selling through bookstores, broadcasting, or arranging physical
meetings.
The information was also of a high quality. Group information is of-
ten better than individual information, especially where the group can
debate and draw on experts.235 The internet made the production of group
information much less costly, as many could analyze and contribute in-
formation through software.236
Participants had low search costs. Other than attention costs and a
mouse click, they received information about the stunt and potential col-
laborators with no marginal costs. They also had low costs of advertising
their own availability: no resumes, interviews, or commercials, just a
click to post a comment. They had low processing costs, as the informa-
tion came in usable form, requiring no special hardware or effort to
understand.
Preexisting, though loose, associations also reduced the information
costs of searching for collaborators. 7 Creating ties between two groups
provides greater value more quickly than creating ties between individu-
234. In addition, the blogs collaboratively created, accredited, and distributed the infor-
mation. See, e.g., Caio M. S. Pereira Neto, Online Collaborative Media and Political Economy
of Information: A Case Study, 21 J. MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L. 515 (2003).
235. GILLMOR, supra note 201; cf Thomas Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bank-
ruptcy Law, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 180, at 322 (discussing how individual risk-
assessments are corrected through market aggregation).
236. RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 180.
237. The preexisting groups consisted of like-minded people, associated loosely through
blogs. Future blogstorms could draw from churches, which provide organization on the right.
They could also draw from unions, as such households are likely to be online. JOHNSON, supra
note 187, at 56.
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als.23 ' As a result of these associations, mainly through blogs, a site like
BoycottSBG.com could launch a massive campaign overnight. 9
Conversely, the internet raised the costs of spreading some informa-
tion that could have harmed collective action, like information about
social distinction, race, gender, geography, or other stigmas. These were
less easily communicated online than in person-to-person contact.24°
b. Allocation Costs
In conjunction with the low information costs, the cost of allocating
tasks was low. Because of the low search and self-advertising costs, no
central entity had to bear the costs of identifying those best suited for
particular tasks, or those with relevant information. The participants al-
located themselves, not only to the blogstorm, but to different tasks
within it.
The participants understood the effectiveness of grassroots alloca-
tion. Unlike the DNC which asked for no feedback, the owners of A-list
blogs "allocated" work by admitting their lack of expertise, and inviting
users to self-select and contribute their own expertise.24' Bloggers often
actively solicited user-email: "[I]n this case [derivative suits] I'm par-
ticularly interested in hearing [from] folks with professional insight into
how this might work.' 242 Indeed, bloggers even criticize users who
"whine" to the bloggers instead of allocating themselves and taking "ac-
tion on their own" without blogger guidance.24'
238. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 58-61 (discussing how Reed's Law, which holds
that the value of connecting networks is exponential, is more powerful than Metcalfe's Law,
which holds the value of a network connecting individuals to all other individuals in the net-
work increases with the square of the number of individuals).
239. For Sinclair, its previous reputation also lowered information costs. The participants
found little need to continue searching for information on Sinclair's motives; that could be
assumed.
240. It is unclear what role this plays in online collaboration, but it is likely a positive
effect. Kollock, supra note 222.
241. Lawyers, television industry veterans, and investors provided detailed advice to
help plan and to refine the participants' strategies. Sinclair Advertiser Boycott, Database,
http://www.boycottsbg.com/advertisers/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
242. See, e.g., Marshall, A Suggestion from a Reader, supra note 79.
243. Posting of Kos to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/l/3/135759/4341
(Jan. 3, 2005, 11:57 PDT) ("To name three examples-the Sinclair Boycott people, the Buy
Blue people, and Operation Fool Me Once were all built by Kosmopolitans [Daily Kos users]
who didn't whine about an issue getting covered or not covered[;] they took action on their
own.").
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c. Collaborative Costs
The participants also had low collaborative costs. Communication
was cheap through software for blogging, email, internet chat, and phone
calls. ' "
Participants even lowered the collaborative and individual costs
through constant feedback that pushed individuals to more cost-effective
actions. For example, participants advised other participants not to waste
time challenging licenses or petitioning the FCC or Sinclair, but to target
key employees for advertisers for the 6pm newscast.2 5
Participants bore low collaborative costs in part because contribu-
tions did not deprive the participants of their contributions' value.
Contributing information is not like contributing apples, as participants
benefited from the information even after contributing it.
46
The blogstorm also benefited from the low costs of mistakes. The
risk of making mistakes was high, but the cost of such mistakes' was
low. Phone calls to the wrong advertisers annoyed the recipients, but
they informed new people, and a few wrong calls for a day were, rela-
tively, not very costly. Moreover, the participants worked quickly
together to correct these mistakes. In addition, unlike creating software,
the "bugs" of calling the wrong people did not have to be detected and
undone before going forward in the right direction.
d. Integration Costs
The blogstorm had low integration costs partly because of what the
blogstorm was producing (another's action), and partly because of tech-
nology. The project was not producing an integrated finished product,
like an operating system. Other parties, such as advertisers and Sinclair,
had to integrate these actions to determine the blogstorm's facts and their
own responses.
The internet also lowered the costs of the little internal integration
the users performed. For example, one person was able to manage Boy-
cottSBG.com, assembling the user-volunteered information for an
advertiser database, eliminating redundancy among the listed advertisers,
categorizing advertisers by market, and keeping the database updated.
244. Cf JOHNSON, supra note 187, at 3 (discussing how email costs, compared to letter
costs, increased communication from constituents to Congress).
245. See, e.g., Marshall, A Suggestion from a Reader, supra note 79.
246. See Kollock, supra note 222, at 225-26 (providing illustrations showing that, out-
side the internet, a non-wealthy individual usually cannot produce a public good alone).
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e. Low Individual Costs
The individuals bore low costs for three reasons. First, the blogstorm
could be broken into pieces. Where individuals can break a project into
small pieces, each small piece imposes a small cost. Second, the pieces
were small enough for individuals to handle alone: including watching
news and listing the advertisers, trashing Sinclair's stock on Yahoo! Fi-
nance, contacting Sinclair stations and advertisers, contacting media, and
contacting institutional investors. Third, the tasks were of various sizes
and specialties, which permitted those of varying motivations and skills
to contribute based on the variable CoStS.
247
In addition, no extra costs were imposed on the volunteers. Many of
the blogs had no login requirements or passwords,2 4 ' despite the fear of
potential "trolls. 2 9 Many participants did not even pay for their long-
distance because some phone plans charge the same rate up to a certain
number of minutes.
Moreover, network effects lowered individuals' costs. "Network ef-
fects" refer to situations where the "value of membership ... is
enhanced by an increase in the numbers of other members."250 With
fewer fellow-participants, each participant had higher costs, as there
would be more work to do. With more participants, costs of participation
decreased. 5 In addition, those joining with fewer members bore heavier
risk-costs, as it was less likely that others would join and make their ef-
fort worthwhile early on.252
2. Sufficient Motivation and Capacity
Although the internet has lowered the costs of collaboration, which
253should affect any potential blogstorm, some costs do remain. As a result,
247. See Benkler, Linux, supra note 2, at 439.
248. Cf CRUMLISH, supra note 36, at 35, 77 (Dean's campaign requiring login decreased
traffic). Crumlish argues that advocacy groups should "[m]ake it easy to contribute thoughts
and ideas. Create the most minimal possible barriers to entry." Id. at 77.
249. Trolls are those who disagree with users on a particular blog, and they merely at-
tempt to annoy and waste users' time. Users can handle trolls by ignoring them, which is
usually effective, or through other mechanisms. For example, the Dean campaign had a dedi-
cated troll-fund: users would donate more money to Dean whenever a troll made a comment,
which convinced trolls their actions were counterproductive. See id. at 41.
250. See Aviram, supra note 64, at 1195.
251. See Pereira Neto, supra note 234, at 517; Benkler, L'nux, supra note 2, at 434-35.
252. This helps explain why the number of other people joining a group often deter-
mines if a later individual will join-for lynch mobs, stock sales, riots, strikes, rumors, and
leaving a social gathering. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 175.
253. This reflects in part what Sifry calls "open source" politics:
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a group must have the motivation and capacity to overcome these (ad-
mittedly low) costs. 4 Therefore, limitations on the frequency and power
of future blogstorms will likely not be costs (unless internet laws or
standards raise the costs of speech and collaboration),"' but motivation
and capacity. Although Sinclair's stunt inspired a blogstorm, many simi-
lar events did not. To understand the future of ad hoc regulation, we must
analyze what kind of motivation and message inspired the Sinclair blog-
storm. This will help determine the kind of motivation and capacity that
may spark future regulatory blogstorms.
a. Sufficient Motivation
Individuals have wildly different (rational and irrational) motiva-
tions and different motivation thresholds to act in different
circumstances. A blogstorm is possible where enough people reach their
motivation thresholds. 57
(1) A Few Highly Motivated Participants. At least some highly moti-
vated participants appear necessary to start a blogstorm. First, before
others join, the individual collaboration costs are high. Second, highly
motivated participants can lower others' costs by joining and by deliber-
ately making it easier for others. With Sinclair, these participants
researched lines of attack and developed websites, email lists, sample
letters, and databases. 8
Applied to political organizing, open source would mean opening up participation
in planning and implementation to the community, letting competing actors evalu-
ate the value of your plans and actions, being able to shift resources away from bad
plans and bad planners and toward better ones, and expecting more of participants
in return. It would mean moving away from egocentric organizations and toward
network-centric organizing.
Sifry, supra note 31, at 19.
254. For a discussion of collaborative costs online versus collaborative costs through
hierarchies and markets, see Benkler, Linux, supra note 2. This entire discussion benefits
greatly from Benkler's seminal work.
255. Cf LAWRENCE LEssiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs
and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 NYU L. REV. 23 (2001); Yochai
Benkler, Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core Common Infrastruc-
ture 27 (White Paper for the Brennan Center for Justice), http://www.benkler.org/
WhitePaper.pdf (2001) [hereinafter Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure].
256. See Herbert Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 180, at 299, 299-302.
257. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 174 (arguing "a diversity of cooperation thresh-
olds among the individuals can tip a crowd into a sudden epidemic of cooperation").
258. See, e.g., Marshall, In the Last, supra note 88.
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Beyond starting a blogstorm, highly motivated participants are nec-
essary for specific activities. Some activities cannot be divided easily
among more than one person and require considerable effort from that
one person. For the Sinclair blogstorm, integration required one highly
motivated participant for the advertiser boycott.
(2) "Medium" Likelihood of Success. Users should be most moti-
vated by a project with some, but not an overwhelming, likelihood of
success.n9 When it appears likely the group will provide the public good,
individuals have an incentive to free-ride, so not enough individuals will
work to produce the good.26" When it appears unlikely the group will
provide the good, individuals have little incentive to contribute because
their contribution will be wasted.26' With the Sinclair blogstorm, the us-
ers felt they could succeed, but did not feel success was a foregone
conclusion.262
(3) Network Effects and Motivation. In addition to lowering costs,
network effects also can increase motivation. Larger blogstorms can
likely better support diverse motivations. A smaller blogstorm may ap-
peal to fewer potential participants because there are fewer available
activities that could best use their skills.263
(4) Short lime-Horizon. The blogstorm's short time-horizon likely
helped support the participants' motivation, making procrastination less
attractive. If one assumes that the users had a wide range of procrastina-
tion-tendencies, the short time-horizon would have encouraged those
with both high and low tendencies to act almost immediately, and to-
gether.
The blogstorm appeared to rely on short bursts of enthusiasm. While
Steve Soto suggested a long-term effect of a campaign, 264 one of his users
259. In addition, this medium-level likelihood of success can sustain two concurrent
motivations--efficacy and challenge, discussed below with non-economic motivations.
260. See Kollock, supra note 222, at 224 (noting this is so even when the group's goal is
to protest).
261. Id. at 223. This lack of incentive conforms to the advice, "You can't fight City
Hall:' which suggests you should not even try.
262. The creation of Linux operating system provides an example of how the increase in
likelihood of success sparked collaboration. There, one individual, Linus Torvalds, created the
kernel of an operating system and asked others to help. Once the kernel was available, the
likelihood of success increased to the point where others were willing to contribute without
feeling impotent. Id. at 230-31.
263. A larger blogstorm increases the likelihood a task would interest a potential partici-
pant because it permits participants to "scour large groups of resources in search of materials,
projects, collaborations, and combinations" See Benkler, Linux, supra note 2, at 366-67.
264. Steve Soto, supra note 38 ("on the longer term, I think the license challenge cam-
paign can really send a message and point media coverage to this issue and to Sinclair's
detriment").
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suggested that it was more short-term for him: "I'll be on this nonstop
for the next week at least., 265 Indeed, the time-horizon for most blog-
storms may be even shorter than Sinclair's. This blogstorm benefited
from incremental short-term goals, like stock price changes and adver-
tiser withdrawals.266 Long battles could also dissuade many potential
participants upfront, as individuals would realize that they would be-
come part of the blogstorm community for months or years, and may not
want to take on even a loose commitment.26'
In addition, a short time-horizon may take advantage of participants'
initial, "hot" reaction.268 A longer time-horizon could cause participants
to "cool off," and act less on emotional impulse. In addition, partici
pants can get bored over time 270 and devote their excess labor to other
endeavors.2" Since blogstrom activities would get boring for participants
at different rates, the number of participants would decrease as partici-
pants lose motivation at different moments, which could increase costs
on those remaining, including to a level above the motivational levels of
many users. Having many different activities to complete could keep
participants in the blogstorm for longer than having few activities.272
265. Posting of Lud to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.com/cgi-bin/mt-
comments.cgi?entryid=2856 (Oct. 11, 2004, 11:48 EDT).
266. Beyond the effect of waning enthusiasm, the early stages of the Sinclair blogstorm
may have had a wider pool of users than the later stages for other reasons. The first stages
involved activities that the users enjoy so much they did them everyday-blog-like activities
such as expressing rage, proposing ideas, and debating in short, unpunctuated posts.
The later stages involved non-blog activities for implementation-calling advertisers to
complain, calling institutional investors, sending form emails, and discussing stocks on bulle-
tin boards. So it is likely that the pool of users from the blogs who enjoyed the early stages
was larger than those who enjoyed the later stages.
267. This is supported by Amartya Sen's theory that many actions are not motivated by
pure rationality but in part by taking on a commitment, such as to pay taxes even if one will
not be audited. See Katz, supra note 180, at 37.
268. Cf SETH GODIN, PURPLE Cow 2-3 (2003) (explaining to marketers that cows are
beautiful when unique, but soon become boring and unremarkable).
269. See Jackson, supra note 235, at 324-25 (discussing paternalism, regret, and impulse
control); Daniel Gilbert, Four More Years of Happiness, N.Y TImEs, Jan. 20, 2005, at A23
("people typically overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions to ad-
versity"); cf JOHNSON, supra note 187, at 40-41 (discussing a proposed cool-off period for
direct democracy to correct impulsive tendencies).
270. That is, diminishing marginal utility from participating in the blogstorm.
271. This may contradict economists' assumptions of stable preferences, but it may be
more accurate based on psychology. See Katz, supra note 180, at 37.
272. The evidence from MoveOn.org supports this idea. MoveOn.org activists constantly
shifted activities, with movie-watching house parties, conference calls, national bake sales,
amateur advertising contests, get-out-the-vote canvassing, letter-writing campaigns, a virtual
march on Washington, D.C., among other activities. See, e.g., Moveon.org: Democracy in
Action, http://www.moveon.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Moveon.org].
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(5) Non-Monetary Motivations. Participants likely must have non-
monetary motivations to take part in a regulatory blogstorm. 2" For the
blogstorm to derive solely from economic motivations, the participants
would have to ensure they would be paid. Considering the high costs of
establishing payment mechanisms for thousands of people and the likely
low payments to each participant for their minor contributions, the trans-
action costs would likely far outweigh the economic benefits to the
participants. Accordingly, unless transaction costs of setting and enforc-
ing contracts can come down or an entity funds the actions, it is likely
that non-monetary motivations must support a blogstorm.
As "diverse motivations [beyond monetary self-interest] animate
human beings,, 274 several non-monetary motivations could support a
blogstorm.2 15 For the participants in the Sinclair blogstorm to reach their
motivation-thresholds, the contributing motivations were likely di-
verse-both across the range of participants and for each participant
with more than one motivation.276
(i) Efficacy. Participants may be inspired by the desire to affect their
environment. 77 With the blogstorm, many could have felt effective
through special expertise, like living in a Sinclair local market or being a
broadcaster or lawyer.18 This sense of efficacy would have partly coun-
teracted the interest to free-ride.
2 79
273. For a discussion of what she calls the "ethos" of online activism groups, see Laura
J. Gurak, The Promise and Peril of Social Action In Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES, supra note
25, at 243.
274. Benkler, Linux, supra note 2, at 378; see Katz, supra note 180, at 37. Standard
economics recognizes this point. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th
ed. 2003) ("[S]elf-interest should not be confused with selfishness; the happiness (or for that
matter the misery) of other people may be a part of one's satisfaction.").
275. Americans' non-monetary motivations, in fact, were apparent in the election, as
large numbers on both sides voted against their monetary interests. See, e.g., THOMAS FRANK,
WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA
(2004).
276. Indeed, diverse motivations lead individuals to form relationships with people. See,
e.g., Well & Gulia, supra note 25, at 171.
277. After all, the participants had been providing semi-daily commentary in an attempt
to change their environment, largely through elections and party-building. See, e.g., posting of
Kos to Daily Kos, http://dailykos.com/story/2004/l 1/30/102859/54 (Nov. 30, 2004, 08:28
PDT).
278. For example, a commenter in law school gave advice and wrote with apparent joy:
"I just learned about shareholder derivative lawsuits this week. (Yay!)" Posting of Matt Davis
to The Left Coaster, http://www.theleftcoaster.comcgi-bin/mt-comments.cgi?entry-id=2856
(Oct. 11, 2004, 13:11 EDT).
279. This turned it into an assurance game for "experts" with best-shot aggregation.
They could not assume others could perform their task, and would understand that if others in
other broadcast markets also worked, they would all benefit.
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In addition, participants would have felt effective even without com-
plete success, 8" because of the tangible effects of following the pull-out
of each advertiser,28' of reading notes from advertisers posted on the
blogsU2 and of tracking every dip in the stock price.2 3 For example, one
commenter posted a small success: a letter from Pepsi Cola Company,
which explained that it favored accurate and balanced journalism and
stated that it had no national advertising buys with Sinclair.2 M
Significantly, redundancy did not undermine feelings of efficacy.
Without a central allocator, participants ran the risk of redundantly per-
forming the same tasks others were performing, for no benefit. The costs
of redundancy, however, were low for many activities-watching a news
program. Other activities even benefited from the redundancy, such as
phone calls to advertisers and institutional investors. Posting redundant
comments on different blogs helped spread information. 5 Redundancy
also permitted people with different backgrounds and skills to address
the same problems, providing a wider, perhaps more innovative, range of
280. See Don Hazen, Moving On: A New Kind of Peace Activism, ALTERNET, Feb. 11,
2003, http://www.alternet.org/story/15163 ("They offer ... something specific to do and im-
mediate feedback.").
281. Names of other withdrawing advertisers surfaced. Posting of JBLIII to Daily Kos,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/12/121355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 14:50 PDT). Boy-
cottSBG.com, however, eventually did not publish their names, because advertisers did
not want any recognition. Sinclair Advertiser Boycott, FAQ-Pulled Ads, http://
www.boycottsbg.com/FAQ.htm#pulledads (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) ("The consensus is that
the advertisers do not want to be praised, they want to be left alone. This just opens them to
more pressure from the opposition. From what we've heard, they don't even want to be
thanked[;] they want to get back to business.").
282. For example, a local furniture store sent a scathing letter to Sinclair:
As an advertiser on your Minneapolis affiliate, KMWB23, we are appalled at Sin-
clair Broadcasting Group's lack of corporate citizenship in the mandatory
broadcasting of 'Stolen Hour.'
The deliberate support of any candidate over another candidate has no place in me-
dia programming governed by FCC regulations.... It is our intention to cease
advertising with your affiliate unless actions are taken by the Sinclair Broadcast
Group to establish and maintain fair and balanced viewpoints in programming.
Posting of Dqw5644 to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/12/121355/52
(Oct. 12, 2004, 16:37 PDT).
283. Cf. RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 117.
284. Posting of AllenB101 to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/11/
163831/07 (Oct. 13, 2004, 20:09 PDT).
285. See, e.g., Debra, supra note 98 (pasting a comment from the Eschaton blog); post-
ing of CapeFearforKerry to Al Franken Blog, http://airamericaradio.com/weblogs/
sowhatelseisnews/index.php?/frankencomments/1916/ (Oct. 11, 2004, 12:56 EDT) (noting
Sylvan Learning's pull out and directing Al Franken blog users to Daily Kos).
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options. Finally, redundancy ensured that verifiable information was cor-
rect, despite possible incompetent or malicious participants.
(ii) Challenge/Fun. Many individuals enjoy challenge in part for its
own sake, and so play chess, video games, or athletics. 6 Indeed, leaders
can often motivate people with the enormity of the challenge ahead and
the correlative feeling of efficacy resulting from surmounting the enor-
mous challenge. 7 Similarly, many could have considered the blogstorm
fun.8
(iii) Policy/Political. Many were motivated based on policy or poli-
tics. Some of these motivations included opposition to (1) general media
bias, (2) conservative media bias, (3) dirty campaigning, (4) the Swift-
boat Veterans opposing Kerry, and (5) President Bush's reelection. The
election provided considerable motivation, and encapsulated a wide di-
versity of motivations, both economic and non-economic (environmental
protection, healthcare, protecting the middle-class, among others). The
proximity between Sinclair's stunt and the election motivated the par-
ticipants, as did the presence of Sinclair stations in swing states.8 9
(iv) Public Interest. Many people prefer believing their actions are
not based solely on self-interest. Research shows that individuals are
often more generous to others than self-interest would require.29 Indeed,
one pervasive social rationale for the pursuit of self-interest in a com-
petitive market is that an "invisible hand" will benefit all, providing an
altruistic reason for self-interest,29' even if many economists disagree that
this theory represents reality.292 Many of the blogstorm participants were
286. See Kollock, supra note 222, at 232 (using the collaboration on Linux as an illustra-
tion).
287.
Sure, it would require some sacrifice. But remember J.FK.'s words when he sum-
moned us to go to the moon on Sept. 12, 1962: "We choose to go to the moon in
this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are
hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies
and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are
unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win."
Thomas L. Friedman, Fly Me to the Moon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, § 2, at 13.
288. Cf RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 64 ("A great deal of peer-to-peer technology was
created for fun-the same reason the PC and Web first emerged from communities of amateur
enthusiasts.").
289. Marshall, The Times Today, supra note 23 ("Those 62 stations include affiliates of
all six major broadcast networks in Florida, Ohio, Wisconsin, Nevada and Pennsylvania.").
290. RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 129.
291. MICHAEL NOVAK, THE UNIVERSAL HUNGER FOR LIBERTY 51-52 (2004) (using
Adam Smith to defend free markets based on Catholic and other religious principles).
292. See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 219, at 3; Stiglitz, supra note 179.
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responding to their own sense of public interest. For example, many be-
lieved that it was in the public's interest to receive balanced journalism,
and they served the public interest through taking part in the blogstorm.
(v) Moral Outrage/Animosity. Another motivation was moral out-
rage. Research demonstrates that individuals often take actions against
their self-interest to penalize norms-violators to the benefit of the
293group. Moral outrage and other subtle punishments enforce many so-
cial norms.294 As I have argued, with Sinclair, the participants were
morally outraged, regarding the stunt as an off-the-charts norms-
violation. 5
Similarly, animosity is motivational. 296 It motivated both sides in the
2004 election. 297 The blogstorm participants had a deep animosity for
Sinclair and other alleged-members of conservative media. Two of the
activities even permitted the participants to communicate this animos-
ity-posting on Yahoo! Finance boards and calling advertisers.
(vi) Reciprocity. Partly through immediate self-interest and partlythrouh , . 298
through psychology, participants could be motivated to contribute to
blogstorms in part because others were contributing. Indeed, the costs of
many contributions were low-contributing information they already
knew or to which they had easy access-while the benefits from others'
299contribution were high-receiving vast amounts of new information.
293. SANDLER, supra note 219, at 126.
294. Since punishing norms-violators benefits the group, those who do not punish are
themselves free-riding on those who enforce social norms. So punishing may be another form
of generosity. Id. at 128-29.
295. Rosen, supra note 15; cf Too Generous, supra note 22 ("It's not a 'fairness' or a
free speech issue. It's a massive and quite public case of election and campaign finance
fraud.").
296. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 48 ("One time-tested way of inducing a
group to work together is to introduce an external threat.").
297. Observers suggested that animosity to Bush motivated Democrats even more than
devotion to any candidate; the Democratic candidate was "Anybody But Bush." See, e.g.,
Robert Novak, The Anti-Bush, August 7, 2003, CNN.CoM, http://www.cnn.com/2003/
ALLPOLITICS/08/07/column.novak.opinion.antibush/ (ascribing Howard Dean's early suc-
cess to his anti-Bush stance).
The Republicans also motivated their supporters through animosity to Democrats (or gay
marriage, French people, liberal elites, Massachusetts liberals, Hollywood, the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, or People for the American Way) and,
perhaps, won the election as a result. John Zogby, What's the Matter with the Incumbent
Rule?, ZOGBY'S REAL AMERICA, Nov. 2004, at 1, available at http://www.zogby.com/news/
ReadNews.dbm?ID--93 1.
298. RHEINGOLD, supra note 24.
299. Cf id., at 30, 71 (noting "Napster is nothing more than a folder full of MP3s if
you're the only user") (quoting Cory Doctorow); CRUMLISH, supra note 36, at 225 (noting that
a stranger helped him debug software because, according to the stranger, "it wasn't difficult
for him to help me, so why not?").
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(vii) Community. Users may have felt tied to the community on their
favorite blog(s), and users felt an obligation to help for the same reason
alumni may donate to their colleges. "Virtual" social bonds possibly can
be as meaningful as many "personal" bonds.m The community can be
part of a user's identity such that the user may want the community to
succeed for apparently self-interested reasons.
Alternatively, perhaps the users considered the blogstorm itself to be
a community ritual, akin to attending church or putting on a school play.
Despite the costs, it built a community through bonds of memories and
obligations for immediate and future benefit or enjoyment."'
b. Sufficient Capacity
In addition to motivation, the blogstorm needed sufficient capacity to
succeed. This included both labor and message. Sufficient labor is neces-
sary to perform the actions. And, as marketing and memetic theory
suggest, participants need a compelling message to galvanize this labor.
(1) Labor.-
(i) Increments of Excess Capacity. The blogstorm relied on the par-
ticipants' excess labor capacity. The participants had excess labor
capacity-extra minutes in the day to contribute to leisure or labor. They
devoted excess capacity to the blogstorm where it outweighed the oppor-
tunity costs of performing other activities in those spare moments.
Aggregating this excess capacity across the wide range of users resulted
in a large amount of labor.02
Because the participants had enough labor, they could communicate
with advertisers using more than email. Email has the advantage of be-
ing cheap for a participant,3 °3 but the disadvantage of being cheap for
everyone. Those opposed to a blogstorm can just as easily mobilize
counter-emails, perhaps neutralizing the blogstorm's emails with an ap-
parent showing of equal support. Also, email recipients understood that
the sender expended perhaps minimal (cut and paste) resources to send
300. See CRUMLISH, supra note 36, at 190, 230-231.
301. Indeed, weeks after the blogstorm, members of Daily Kos referred to the blogstorm
nostalgically for how the community came together. See, e.g., VirginiaDem, supra note 6.
302. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Shar-
ing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L. J. 273 (2004), available at http://
www.yalelawjoumal.org/pdf/l 14-2/BenklerFINALYLJl14-2.pdf; see also RHEINGOLD,
supra note 24, at 65. As a result, the blogstorm reflects the internet's ability to mobilize "five
minute activists" because of low transaction costs. For example, in 2003, Moveon.org had
300,000 "five minute activists." JOHNSON, supra note 187, at 36.
303. Emails are cheap not only in money, but also in time, being immediate.
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an email, so they could be less responsive to emails than letters or phone
calls.3 4
(ii) Magnifying Labor's Power Through Advertisers. Because of how
advertising funds television programs, boycotting advertisers magnifies
the boycotters' power beyond their numerical strength in a direct boy-
cott. Indeed, a boycott of Sinclair would likely have done very little:
many of the liberal participants would not have watched Sinclair, or Sto-
len Honor, to begin with.05 Edwin Baker has analyzed how advertiser
boycotts magnify the effort of those attempting to influence a media
company. He argues that advertisers "often wish to avoid.., content that
offends or takes a position on a controversial issue" for four possible
reasons, two of which are relevant here. First, advertisers want to attract
the largest possible audienceya Material taking a position on controver-
sial issues could segment the audience; with the 2004 election, the public
was evenly divided on Bush and Kerry.
Second, advertisers usually desire not to offend any potential cus-
tomers. Baker argues that this is a major concern for advertisers because
"the last thing advertisers want is for their advertising to drive customers
away., 30 7 Baker argues that, "[g]iven the small chance that an advertise-
ment will ... influence[e] any individual viewer, each alienated viewer
costs the advertiser more than is gained from each viewer pleased by the
programming."30 s Advertising that attracts consumers is difficult and ex-
pensive to craft: advertising on a controversial show that drives
consumers away would waste these resources and repel consumers in-
stead of attract them.
This fear of driving away customers plays a large role in the effec-
tiveness of advertiser boycotts, because even those who do not view the
program will associate a product with a controversial position they op-
pose. As a result, these costs and benefits to an advertiser often empower
even a small group to change programming.3°9 Because even a relatively
small group can affect programming, Baker argues that the "advertisers'
fear of offending potential customers leaves the media disproportionately
subject to actual and threatened consumer boycotts ... directed at sup-
304. Evidence from Congress suggests as much. See JOHNSON, supra note 187, at 3, 9,
60.
305. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1836-37.
306. BAKER, supra note 80, at 56.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 60.
309. Id. at 61 (arguing that "even if the vast majority of television viewers would like to
see a program that took a controversial position, a realistically threatened boycott by a rela-
tively small number of viewers is often leads a 'rational' sponsor to withdraw").
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pressing material offensive to some organized group."3 ° There is a long
history of successful advertiser boycotts and successful threatened boy-
cotts, from the McCarthy period through the present, that targeted
politically suspect performers, allegedly indecent or violent material, and
political commentators on the left or right.3 '
Indeed, during the Sinclair blogstorm, advertisers acted largely as
Baker would suggest. BoycottSBG.com explained: "The consensus is
that the advertisers ... want to be left alone. [Praise] just opens them to
more pressure from the opposition.... [T]hey don't even want to be
thanked, [sic] they want to get back to business.
'312
(2) Message. The blogstorm could not have taken shape, or suc-
ceeded, without a message that participants would find compelling. The
usual metaphor for a message is the spread of a virus. Some marketing
theorists believe certain ideas can act like idea-viruses and self-market
themselves.3 Some cultural scholars believe certain messages can act
like "memes"-viral ideas that use people to replicate themselves.1
More importantly, the message has to be compelling to those outside
the blogstorm. The Sinclair message benefited from two simple facts. It
was communicable in one sentence to each relevant group and appeared
immediately to violate already-held social norms.
The public largely agreed with the participants' unstated theory of
market power; seventy percent of Americans think media companies are
too large.3"5 Sinclair's perceived actions were exactly the kind many
feared of large media companies-favoring incumbent government and
currying regulatory favors.
The public also agreed with the perceived status quo of apolitical
broadcasters.3 6 People are more receptive to retaining the status quo than
altering it. Studies show that individuals are often risk-averse when con-
fronted with potential gains but risk-seeking when confronted with
potential losses. 3 7 Responding to Sinclair reinforced the status quo.
310. Id. at 57.
311. Id. at 58.
312. Sinclair Advertiser Boycott, FAQ, http://www.boycottsbg.com/FAQ.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2005).
313. SETH GODIN, UNLEASHING THE IDEAVIRUS (2000).
314. See, e.g., J. M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998).
315. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MEDIA DIVERSITY
AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2 (2001), http://www.consumerfed.org/
MediaSurveylO.31.02.pdf.
316. Rosen, supra note 15.
317. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 226, at 304-07. For example, consum-
ers are more willing to forego a gain, like an individual discount, than to pay a loss, like an
individual surcharge. Id. at 281.
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For example, even the blogstorm's chosen remedy conformed with
most Americans' views of the status quo. In general, over 90% of Ameri-
cans believed that broadcasters should provide equal time to both major
party candidates.38 This conformed to Americans' general viewing pref-
erence: most claimed to prefer getting news from balanced sources.319 A
survey before the stunt showed that the vast majority of Americans, 78%,
would prefer that Sinclair air the other side of the issue if it broadcasted
Stolen Honor; only 10% thought a response was not necessary.3' ° Among
the public, there appeared more support for showing both Stolen Honor
and an opposing view than for not showing Stolen Honor at all."'
To the extent the participants' views were not already widely held by
Americans, their message may have benefited from credible analysts. A
former FCC chairman, along with Democratic senators, likely had some
credibility to the public at large, advertisers, and institutional investors,
even if some blogs may have lacked that credibility.
D. Towards a Better Blogstorm
Although the Sinclair blogstorm was extremely powerful, it failed in
many ways. It dissolved quickly (perhaps a byproduct of its low start-up
costs) and gave birth to a much weaker organization, at most, whose am-
bitions were low compared to other proposed blogstorms (like
destroying Fox News). It merely altered one hour of highly controversial
programming by a debt-laden company. Meanwhile, the liberal users
wanted to take down media consolidation itself, because they believed
the FCC had failed on consolidation. On the blogstorm's third day, par-
ticipants aimed for the "right-wing" media3 22 and proposed to patrol
Sinclair, to "finish off Sinclair," or to destroy Fox News,323 Rush Lim-
baugh, Sean Hannity, or Matt Drudge.324 More people watch and listen to
Fox News and Rush Limbaugh every month than voted for George Bush
or John Kerry in 2004, so destroying either of the former would be a tall
318. Id. at 6.
319. Sixty-seven percent prefer to get news from sources with no particular point of
view, while only a quarter prefer news reflecting their leanings. PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
LARGE IN FRAGMENTED POLITICAL NEWS UNIVERSE 4-5 (2003), http://www.pewinternet.org/
pdfs/PIP_- Political InfoJan04.pdf.
320. CONSUMER UNION, MEDIA SURVEY 12 (2004), http://www.consumersunion.org/
pub/CU%20MEDIA%20SURVEY.pdf.
321. Id. at 8-12.
322. See, e.g., Kos, Sinclair Advertiser DB Up, supra note 59.
323. Posting of Birdie to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/l2/
121355/52 (Oct. 12, 2004, 18:31 PDT).
324. See, e.g., VirginiaDem, supra note 6.
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order.325 Media consolidation and the allegedly conservative media were
real concerns among liberal blog-users . 6 Users started sites to take on
Sean Hannity3 27 and Fox News (listing all of its advertisers) .1 8 But the
Sinclair blogstorm ended,329 and none related to it were effective.
Although it is unlikely that a blogstorm could enact an anti-
conservative (or liberal)-media or an anti-media-monopoly agenda, it is
not impossible in theory. The main ingredient to create a blogstorm pow-
erful enough to win the liberal-users' war against mainstream media
would be more blogstorm participants.
1. Labor-Benefits of Increased Capacity
With more participants, larger projects would be possible. A net-
work's power increases by the square of the number of its members, so
new members increase a large networks' power more than they would
325. First, Fox News and Limbaugh can more easily withstand pressure than Sinclair
could. Fox News is arguably the number one cable news channel. Project for Excellence in
Journalism, Cable TV Audience, STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA (2004), http://
www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/narrativecabletv-audience.asp?cat=3&media=5. Limbaugh is,
less arguably, the number one talk radio host. WBAL Radio, The Rush Limbaugh Show,
http://www.wbal.comlshowslimbaugh/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). Second, a blogstorm
against Fox News or Limbaugh targets them based on them being consistently dishonest, so
the goal is more ambitious: destruction, not just altering one hour of broadcast programming.
Third, the Fox News and Limbaugh advertisers are less likely to fold to pressure. Sinclair
stations are local, so Sinclair advertisers included local furniture stores, lawyers, and car deal-
erships. See, e.g., posting of Kos to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/
10/13/141150/25 (Oct. 13, 2004, 12:11 PDT). As Fox News is a cable network, its
sponsors are predominantly national companies. Spending Liberally, http://www.
spendingliberally.org/index.cgi (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). So are many of Limbaugh's. Take
Back the Media!, Media Watch: Rush Libaugh Calls War Protestors "Anti-American, Anti-
Capitalist Marxists and Communists" http://www.takebackthemedia.com/rushbusted.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
326. See posting of Kos to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/12/21/14057/
872 (Dec. 21, 2004, 12:57 PDT); see, e.g., posting of Stephdray to Daily Kos, http://www.
dailykos.com/story/2004/12/22/23654/446 (Dec. 22, 2004, 12:36 PDT); posting of Molls to
Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/12/14/23254/136 (Dec. 14, 2004, 21:02
PDT); posting of Ihlin to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/12/13/20563/326
(Dec. 13, 2004, 18:56 PDT).
327. Ad Nausea, List of Sean Hannity Sponsors, http://www.adnausea.org/sponsors.htmil
(last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
328. Spending Liberally, Companies to Avoid, http://www.spendingliberally.org/
index.cgi?companies=l (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
329. There may have been economic reasons why the blogstorm dissolved so quickly.
Because the blogstorm gathered so cheaply and quickly, individuals may have considered it a
waste of time to devote constant excess labor to media-warfare. When a media-battle popped
up, they would merely join. In the meantime, they could turn instead to blogging, comment-
ing, campaigning, or watching football.
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for a small network.30 An increase in participants also lowers costs for
others to join and decreases new members' risk that they are wasting
their energy.
A large blogstorm permits more diverse actions. People and groups
would have different interests and skills, and more individuals could
bring their interests and skills to bear. If sub-activities need a critical
mass to be effective, more participants make these sub-activities more
likely. As a result, it also permits more people with interests and skills to
help the blogstorm.33'
With more participants, a long blogstorm is more possible. Despite
waning enthusiasm, a large group can provide enough members for low-
level media patrolling over a longer period. Participants could devote no
more than a few minutes a week, as they chose, and it would have a large
effect. Also, some of the participants could meet up physically in groups
and perform extensive outreach while others with less motivation merely
email and boycott.332
With many participants, a participant could devote some excess la-
bor sporadically throughout the year. With enough participants, any
battle would continue without interruption.
Again, the pool can leverage its power through third parties. This in-
cludes advertisers, as Edwin Baker shows,333 and also sibling companies of
their targeted media conglomerates or conservative media 34 Participants
targeting, for example, Fox News or the New York Post, could boycott Fox
Sports, Fox network affiliates, Harper Collins, or 20th Century/Fox.
2. Message-How to Get More Participants
To recruit more participants, the users need to communicate with
more people. They could probably not buy television advertising direct-
ing viewers to blogstorm sites: stations can legally refuse to sell them
advertising,335 and those owned by large media companies would likely
not sell advertisements for blogstorms aimed at them. They could use
330. RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 58-61 (called Reed's Law).
331. Unless there is best-shot aggregation or redundancy is inefficient for other reasons.
332. This is somewhat inexpensive through Meetup.com, but meeting would still cost
more than emailing from home. See Meetup, Organizing Local Interest Groups, http:Il
www.meetup.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
333. BAKER, supra note 80, at 46.
334. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1836.
335. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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billboards. The owners of the billboards, often large media companies,
can refuse to transact.336
Instead, participants could make use of public and leased access ca-
ble channels in the areas that provide such channels. 37 Apparently, a
group made use of such channels in response to the Sinclair stunt.338 In
such channels, the participants would have considerable legal latitude.339
They could use email. Their emails would likely not be illegal, even to
strangers, because they would not be commercial. 3' ° Unsolicited email,
however, is generally unwelcome, and may not convert many. Partici-
pants could use a mass or targeted direct-mailing campaign. The letters
could explain the participants' take on Fox News, media consolidation,
or general media conservatism. A blogstorm-produced mass-mailing
could mirror the letter-writing campaigns of the Howard Dean primary
campaign, where supporters personally wrote letters,341 or could resem-
ble George McGovern's successful mass-mailings in 1972342 or the
Republicans' mailings ever since.343 They could write whatever they want
in mail, 3" but it is more costly than email. Also, they could organize tele-
phone calls, use public spaces for signs and speeches, have house
parties, distribute documentaries (one about Fox News),
34'5 and more.346
Through word of mouth they could link together several existing net-
works, including churches, unions, registered party members,
neighborhood groups, magazine or newspaper subscribers, and college
347groups.
In addition to a medium, the participants would need a message.
They may have to choose a message, either opposing conservative media
336. See, e.g., Project Billboad.org, Billboards, http://www.projectbillboard.org/
billboards.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (stating Clear Channel refused to display their
"Bomb" billboard in Times Square).
337. See, e.g., LAURA R. LINDER, PUBLIC ACCESS TELEVISION (1999).
338. See, e.g., Press Release, Area Cable Access Stations to Show "Hijacking Catastro-
phe" as Counterpoint to KOVR's Anti-Kerry "News Special," supra note 133.
339. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996).
340. See CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7705 (West Suppl. 2005).
341. Gary Wolf, How the Internet Invented Howard Dean, WIRED, Jan. 2004, http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.01/dean-pr.html.
342. CRUMLISH, supra note 36, at 22 (about George McGovern's use in 1972).
343. RICHARD A. VIGUERIE & DAVID FRANKE, AMERICA'S RIGHT TURN: How CONSER-
VATIVES USED NEW AND ALTERNATIVE MEDIA To TAKE POWER (2004).
344. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
345. See OUTFOXED: RUPERT MURDOCH'S WAR ON JOURNALISM (The Disinformation
Company, 2004).
346. See, e.g., Moveon.org, supra note 272.
347. Ben Waxman, It's ime to Look to the Campus, ALTERNET, Dec. 3, 2004,
http:llwww.altemet.orglwiretap/20644/.
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or opposing media deregulation. Some conservatives oppose media con-
solidation, but not necessarily a conservative media. ' If a blogstorm
targets the "conservative" media, the blogstorm would have to convince
Americans that a conservative media exists, since many believe the me-
dia is liberal.349
The proposed blogstorms must have a simple complaint they can
communicate to an advertiser, institutional investor, or consumer in one
sentence. It appears one egregious violation is an easier sell than a series
of diffuse violations. For example, conservative groups galvanize ani-
mosity to Moveon.org not with Moveon.org's many pro-Democrat
activities, but with two advertisements that compared Bush to Hitler, not
even endorsed by Moveon.org.350 By contrast, those proposing blog-
storms because Fox News is allegedly biased refer to material that fills
books and movies.351 Other groups also provide much information. One
claims to watch Fox News "so you don't have to";35 2 it partnered with an
46 353"established" liberal media group, Alternet.org, to create a resource
targeting Fox News.354 Another site tracks all Fox News advertisers.35
Liberal groups could cling to one story and use it as conservatives
used the Moveon.org-Hitler videos. The example must be so egregious
that intent can be presumed. 56 Favorite liberal stories for conservative
media are abundant: Rush Limbaugh's defense of torture at Abu
Ghraib,35 7 his repeated alleged distortions and lies,35" Tom Daschle's ac-
cusation that Limbaugh increased the death threats against Democratic
348. William Safire, Editorial, Win Some, Lose Some, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005, at A17.
349. Cf ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA? THE TRUTH ABOUT BIAS AND THE
NEWS xi (2003).
350. Ad Showing Children Laboring to Pay Off Deficit Wins MoveOn Contest,
CNN.CoM, Jan. 13, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/13/elecO4.prez.
moveon.winningad.ap/ (reporting ads were submitted by those unaffiliated with Moveon.org).
351. See, e.g., AL FRANKEN, LIES AND THE LYING LIARS WHO TELL THEM: A FAIR AND
BALANCED LOOK AT THE RIGHT (2003); OUTFOXED, supra note 345.
352. News Hounds, http://www.newshounds.us/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
353. Posting of Melanie to News Hounds, http://www.newshounds.us/2004/12/06/the-
fight-fox-campaign.php (Dec. 6, 2004, 20:41 EDT).
354. Altemet, Fight Fox, http://www.altemet.org/fightfox/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
355. Spending Liberally, supra note 325.
356. For example, Viacom's "conservative" denial of certain pro-Kerry advertisements
did not attract much participant activity; some even defended Viacom as the least anti-liberal
conglomerate and the owner of Jon Stewart's popular fake news show. See Kos, Sinclair Ad-
vertiser DB Up, supra note 59 (and comments therein).
357. Limbaugh on Torture of Iraqis: U.S. Guards Were "Having a Good ime,"
"Blow[ing] Some Steam Off," MEDIA MATTERS, May 5, 2004, http://medianatters.org/items/
200405050003.
358. See, e.g., STEVE RENDALL ET AL., THE WAY THINGS AREN'T: RUSH LIMBAUGH'S




congressmen (Limbaugh repeatedly had called Daschle "Satan" and "el
Diablo"),' 9 FoxNews.com running a fake anti-Kerry article following the
first debate,3'6 Fox News allegedly having a conservative message-of-the-
day,16' a Fox News host claiming that Osama Bin Ladin wore a "Kerry
for President" button,362 and Fox News lending credibility to the Swift-
boat Veterans against Kerry and playing their allegations for weeks.363
Leadership from Democratic insiders may help, but it could be hard to
find. Conventional wisdom holds that a politician cannot criticize media,
especially media consolidation, without losing an election.364 Bureaucrats
may have less to lose and may speak more freely: for example, Democ-
ratic FCC Commissioners have publicly opposed media consolidation.
Moreover, while running for chairmanship of the Democratic National
Committee, Howard Dean told a Fox News interviewer, "Fox [News] is
the propaganda outlet of the Republican party."366 Such high-level leader-
ship could support a blogstorm's message. Democrats may prefer the
liberal participants to take on Fox News without putting their names be-
hind the effort for fear of reprisal.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
In this section, I briefly discuss some policy considerations. I dis-
cuss, first, the pervasiveness and legal backing of private speech
regulation; second, the increasing likelihood of blogstorms; third,
whether blogstorms can be more socially valuable or harmful than tradi-
tional advocacy groups; fourth, whether blogstorms can be regulated
359. Press Release, FAIR, Rush Limbaugh Demonizes Tom Daschle-Literally, Nov. 22,
2002, http://www.fair.org/press-releases/rush-daschle.html.
360. Cameron's Fake Kerry Story Capped FOX Commentators' Manicure Fixation, ME-
DIA MATTERS, Oct. 4, 2004, http://mediamatters.org/items/200410040006.
361. See OUTFOXED, supra note 345.
362. Cavuto Defended Suggestion that Bin Laden Was Wearing Kerry Campaign Button
in Videotaped Message, MEDIA MATTERS, Nov. 4, 2004, http://mediamatters.org/comments/
latest/200411040008.
363. See, e.g., Conservatives Complained that Swift Boat Vets Were Ignored; Now They
Tout Impact, MEDIA MATTERS, Nov. 5, 2004, http://mediamatters.org/items/200411050002.
364. Norman Solomon, Dean and the Corporate Media Machine, ALTERNET, Dec. 4,
2003, http://www.altemet.org/columnists/story/17317/ ("Howard Dean is asking for media
trouble.").
365. Stephen Labaton, White House Drops Effort to Relax Media Ownership Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/27/business/27cnd-media.html?.
366. Fred Barnes, Editorial, The Ruthless Party, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 7, 2005,
at 7, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/
192gglig.asp (not noting the common ownership between Fox News and the Weekly Stan-
dard).
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without violating the First Amendment; and fifth, how the internet has
enabled regulation across a range of activity, not just media speech.
A. Pervasiveness of Private Speech Regulation and Interested
Parties'Preferences for Certain Forms
Before addressing normative considerations of this particular form
of private speech regulation, we can place it within the larger framework
of private speech regulation. Media companies who complain about the
private speech regulation of advocacy groups often ignore the more per-
vasive private speech regulation throughout media industries. That is,
media companies (or those within media companies) have the power to
regulate private speech. Broadly speaking, private speech regulation in-
cludes the many private forces and actors who distort, or shape, the
communications environment. For over a half-century, private speech
regulation has been recognized as pervasive and a function of both eco-
nomics and law.367 Indeed, the speech industries cannot function without
some private regulation. As a result, opponents of the Sinclair blogstorm
cannot argue against private speech regulation in general. They must
argue against particular forms of it.
Here I briefly discuss two pervasive forms of private regulation: the
allocation of speech rights within and among media organizations, and
advertisers' effects on private speech.
1. Through Government Allocation of Speech Rights
Within media industries, the allocation of legal rights permits private
individuals to determine who can use assets through which to speak.
First, corporate and contract law determine which private individuals and
entities can determine who speaks through which assets. Within a media
company, corporate law helps determine the relative control rights of
executives, business managers, producers, editors, writers, and janitors.
Executives and editors usually can modify the speech of journalists (the
First Amendment generally treats media speech not as the journalists'
speech but as the company's speech);3 68 an executive of a conglomerate
like General Electric can determine by law who speaks through the as-
sets of NBC, which GE owns. Although this seems natural, it is a
367. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
vii, ix-xii (1965).
368. C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 57, 63 (1994).
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pervasive form of private speech regulation of journalists and other me-
dia workers.369
Second, because of law, some corporate communications-
infrastructure owners can determine the speech of consumers and com-
petitors using the infrastructure. Phone companies cannot determine, and
are not responsible for, the speech of callers. So phone companies do not
"privately regulate" callers' speech.370 By contrast, television broadcast-
ers select programs and commercials. They act as "middlemen" for
information, providing accreditation, advising, filtering, and performing
other functions 7' and they can exercise discretion, or private regulation,
by refusing to run ads with which executives disagree.372 Similarly,
newspaper executives can determine what goes in newspaper pages, even
if dissenters offer to pay for advertising space. Companies that own ca-
ble lines can determine which channels to carry and, therefore, exercise a
private regulatory power over channels seeking access.3 73 By statute,
however, they lack this private speech power over broadcasters, who are
guaranteed access.37 a There is a current debate on how much those who
own cable or telephone lines and provide high-speed internet access
through them can control the speech of internet users, content providers,
and independent service providers.375
Third, media industries are self-regulatory across industries and
segments. Industries may adopt formal guidelines, such as the American
Society of Newspaper Editors' Code of Ethics.376 They may also have
informal guidelines. For example, for years cable news organizations
informally would not run advertisements for hard liquor.3 77 Hard-liquor
"speakers" had no ability, then, to speak to CNN viewers.
369. Hale, supra note 223.
370. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
371. Cf CRUMLISH, supra note 36, at 9, 217.
372. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973); Peter Henderson, CBS Blocks PETA, MoveOn Super Bowl Ads, REUTERS, Jan. 16,
2004, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0116-01 .htm.
373. With non-broadcasters, cable companies have determined that certain advertise-
ments will not run on channels they do not even own. Press Release, Peace Action Network,
Anti-War Ads Pulled by Comcast, Jan. 29, 2003, http://www.peace-action.org/pub/releases/
relO I2903.html.
374. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
375. See, Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 255; National Cable & Tele-
communications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
376. American Society of Newspaper Editors, Statement of Principles, available at
http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm (last updated Aug. 28, 2002).
377. Stuart Elliott, In a First, CNN Runs a Liquor Commercial, N.Y. TtMES, March 2,
2005, at C5.
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This means that government in part delegates private speech regula-
tion to certain individuals, from executives to companies owning
communications wires."' Following the Sinclair stunt, Sinclair's CEO
condemned the actions of a "vocal minority" who attempted to abridge
Sinclair's speech rights:
We cannot in a free America yield to the misguided attempts by
a small but vocal minority to influence behavior and trample on
the First Amendment rights of those with whom they might not
379agree.
Law, however, helps make Sinclair's executives a vocal minority-
one that is both more vocal and more a minority than the blogstorm's
participants.38°
2. Through Advertising
Advertisers may serve as private regulators, "regulating" with both
general and specific effects on media. The general effect, according to
Edwin Baker and others, is that media outlets become less likely to be
controversial, more likely to create a "buying mood," and more apt to
appeal not to the entire public but to demographics favored by advertis-
ers-say, affluent individuals between the ages of 25 and 49.38' It also
changes newspapers from being partisan to embracing "objective" jour-
nalism. 38 2 Baker also lists some specific examples of advertisers affecting
content. In 1970, for example, NBC ran a documentary critical of Coca-
Cola; Coca-Cola then withdrew all advertising from NBC; for the next
several years, NBC ran no documentaries critical of major advertisers.3
One advertiser threatened to pull advertising from any station that ran a
specific advertisement against a subsidiary's actions in El Salvador;
when one station ran the ad, the advertiser pulled advertising.l 4 For dec-
ades, cigarette advertising may have affected coverage of cigarettes'
health effects. 38" Newspapers remain cautious about automobile stories
because of automobile advertising revenue, and they may change their
378. Cf Hale, supra note 223.
379. Press Release, Sinclair Broadcasting, Sinclair to Air "A POW Story," Oct. 19, 2004,
http://www.sbgi.net/press/release_20041019_87.shtml.
380. For an excellent discussion of the public/private distinction and censorship by pri-
vate property owners and private media companies, see Magarian, supra note 13.
381. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 80, at 7-42, 62-70.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 48.
384. Id. at 54.
385. Id. at 52-53.
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speech accordingly."6 Indeed, according to Baker, advertisers often
threaten to withdraw advertising based on coverage, and news media
often change their speech as a result.387 Historically, newspapers have
altered coverage, apparently for advertisers, to support management in
strikes, utility companies, and local department stores.388
With Sinclair and other advertiser boycotts, non-advertisers attempt
to use the power of advertisers to privately regulate speech. This may be
more objectionable than situations where the advertisers themselves ex-
ert influence, but the reasons why it would be more objectionable are not
readily apparent.
B. The Increasing Likelihood of Private Regulation
Because of Cheap Technology
Private regulation may increase for several reasons. First, internet
and broadband access continues to increase, as does familiarity with the
internet and blogs for news, opinion, and community.3 89 So there will be
a larger pool of activists for blogstorms, with the attendant possibility of
larger blogstorms.3'9
Second, both conservative and liberal citizens have incentives to en-
gage in such private regulation. On both sides, a set of citizens could
disagree with the party leadership, legislatures, or president and can turn
to private regulation to enact their agendas. As groups on one side in-
crease their activities, the other side will counter with their own.3 9 1
386. Id. at 53.
387. See id. at 54 (discussing real estate advertisers, agricultural advertisers, and others),
108 (discussing rewriting an article about Earth Day to ensure that advertisers would not be
offended).
388. GEORGE SELDES, FREEDOM OF PRESS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1935).
389. See Sifry, supra note 31 ("More than 2 million children aged 6-17 have their own
website, according to a December 2003 survey by Grunwald Associates. Twenty-nine percent
of kids in grades K-3 have their own e-mail address.").
390. In December 2004, the FCC Chairman noted that "[iun recent years, complaints
about television and radio broadcasts have skyrocketed, and the FC.C. has stepped up its en-
forcement in response. Advocacy groups do generate many complaints ... but that's not
unusual in today's Internet world." Michael K. Powell, Op-Ed., Don't Expect the Government
to Be a V-Chip, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at A29.
With more activists, more blogs may gain power; certain blogs may simply increase their
power. Either way, the power of unorganized individuals should increase.
391. Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BuFF. L. REV. 807, 811 n.10
(1993) ("[P]olitical action groups with conservative ideologies, such as the National Federa-
tion for Decency, the Church of Christ, and the American Life Lobby have become more vocal
and active, spurring more liberal groups to counter with their own political action measures.").
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Third, on the right, specifically, many conservatives feel emboldened
by the Republican party's dominance and want to reshape private institu-
tions to reflect what they consider America's conservative values.39 The
right also has more sophisticated organization, in part through churches,
so linking together these many existing organizations would provide
immediate power.
Fourth, the left may have more motivation to use private regulation.
Unlike the right, the left has no foothold in government and few organi-
zations that are not ad hoc (such as churches). In blog-communities,
liberals also believe there are no checks on the Republican agenda.3 93
Many liberals feel that Republicans, who currently control every branch
of government, will be unresponsive to their concerns;3 9' private action is
necessary.3"9 They also think the mainstream media, which ostensibly
"checks" government, has failed or is pro-Republican,396 especially the
broadcast and cable news channels,39 and must be replaced . 3 98 They feel
the Democratic party, which should check Republicans, is weak and of-
ten incompetent; 399 they feel its leadership often crafts poor messages,
falsely claims to be "centrist" while being unimaginative or pro-
392. For example, conservatives would want to reshape media. Regarding Desperate
Housewives, on November 24, 2004, on MSNBC's Scarborough Country, conservative activ-
ist Jennifer Giroux, and Republican strategist Jack Burkman called for private regulation: a
Christmas-shopping boycott of the show's advertisers, Kmart and Target.
393. Many on Daily Kos refer daily to the allegedly imminent American fascism. See,
e.g., posting of Tomtech to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/12/15/223645/28
(Dec. 15, 2004, 20:36 PDT).
394. National Press Club Speech: Securities Regulation (C-Span television broadcast
Jan. 31, 2005) (New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer detailing how the Republican
federal government attempted to thwart his attempts to regulate different industries).
395. Unlike liberals, conservative groups can feel that the government is more respon-
sive to them. On the show discussed in supra note 392, Mr. Burkman thought private
regulation was not enough, chastised the unreliable FCC, and invited President Bush to "join"
the "culture war" and "stick it to" ABC by suspending ABC's broadcast licenses for a week.
396. See, e.g., George Monbiot, A Televisual Fairyland: The U.S. Media Is Disciplined
by Corporate America into Promoting the Republican Cause, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 18,
2005, at 19, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1392770,00.html;
Eric Boehlert, Giving Bush a Pass-Again, SALON.COM, Jan. 20, 2005, http:/iAvww.salon.com/
news/feature/2OO5/OJ/20/media_onminaugurationlindex-np.html?x; James Zogby, Cultural
and Commercial Influences on the Free Press, ARAB AM. INST., Jan. 17, 2005, http:/l
www.aaiusa.org/wwatch/01 1705.htm; posting of Bink to Daily Kos, http:ll
www.dailykos.com/story/2005/1/21/11592/0727 (Jan. 21, 2005, 21:03 PDT).
397. See, e.g., Frank Rich, On Television, Torture Takes a Holiday, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2005, § 2, at 1.
398. See, e.g., Scott Galindez, Building a New Majority, TRUTHOUT.ORG, Jan. 19, 2005,
http://www.truthout.org/docs_05/012005W.shtml.
399. See posting of Philinmaine to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/12/
21/215446/21 (Dec. 21, 2004, 19:54 PDT).
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corporate, and fails to stand up for Democratic values. i They also feel
that election-campaign leadership consists of consultants financially
threatened' by the power of blogs for organizing and message-
making.402 In conjunction with this feeling, bloggers often consider
themselves as helping to provide backbone to individual Democratic of-
ficials or lobbying to change their minds.40'3 Indeed, Barbara Boxer
thanked Daily Kos users for their support after she protested the 2004
Ohio election results and grilled Condoleeza Rice during confirmation
hearings.40 There are historic analogs for those out of power turning to
private regulation," so the users' activist response could be expected,
As a result, participants call for a "Shadow Government"-a group
outside the government composed of progressives and liberals. 4° One
site angrily lambasted Kerry voters:
Your protests will not be listened to by the government, nor cov-
ered by the press. If you don't like it, well, too bad because you
have no recourse. Are you angry yet? Then join our boycotts." 7
Boycotts are popular among these angry liberals. Another, more
popular, liberal site presented a nearly identical sentiment: "The presi-
dent and congress will not address the issues we care about. We can
either stand by ... or we can take action."
Private speech regulation, specifically, may increase because of per-
ceived biases on both sides. Liberal groups believe that most of "the
400. See, e.g., posting of Captainahab to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/
story/2005Il19/225933/083 (Jan. 19, 2005, 20:59 PDT); posting of Blogswarm to Daily Kos,
http://www.dailykos.comlstory/2004/12/5/143129/016 (Dec. 5, 2004, 12:31 PDT).
401. See Sifry, supra note 31.
402. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.
com/archives/week_- 20041 l14.php (Nov. 14, 2004, 20:00 EDT).
403. Posting of Josh Marshall to Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.
com/archives/week_2004_12_19.php (Dec. 20, 2004, 17:01 PDT).
404. Posting of Barbara Boxer to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.comlstory/2005/1/27/
124226/410 (Jan. 27, 2005, 15:11 PDT).
405. For example, a decrease in government consumer protection during the Reagan
administration led to increased consumer boycotts. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 391, at 811
n.10 ("Consumer affairs specialists claim that consumer boycotts are a citizen reaction to the
policies of the Reagan Administration that brought a 'dramatic diminution of support for con-
sumer protection programs at all levels of government,' thus forcing consumer groups to take
self-help measures for mutual aid and self-protection.") (citations omitted).
406. Posting of Meteor Blades to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/11/22/
31512/197 (Nov. 22, 2004, 01:15 PDT).
407. Spending Liberally, supra note 234.
408. See, e.g., posting of Rabidnation to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/
story/200511/11/5162/98777 (Jan. 11, 2005, 03:16 PDT).
409. See, e.g., Our Mission and Purpose, BuyBlue.org, supra note 9.
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news media" are biased heavily against liberals1 ° and Democrats.4 On
the other side, conservatives are just as convinced "the media" is lib-
eral, 42 especially Dan Rather and the New York Times editorial page.
Media is a usual target of these attempts at private regulation. For weeks
after the Sinclair stunt, a comment on a liberal blog about CBS and CNN
such as "Maybe we can SInclair [sic] them?" would spark a dozen com-
ments.1 3 Members of Moveon.org believe that media reform is one of
the two most important issues facing the country." So media companies
may see more private speech regulation.
C. Under the Constitution, Can Blogstorms Be Regulated?
In many circumstances, private individuals cannot engage in forms
of private regulation. They cannot privately regulate murder by trying
and executing culprits. They can, however, regulate murder by forming
neighborhood watch groups, locking their doors, and watching for suspi-
cious activity. Public law shapes the private regulation. There is a
concern that blogstorms may harm society. Blogstorms that target speech
can undermine First Amendment values. Political will may be lacking to
regulate blogstorms targeted at indecency; it may be lacking even for
blogstorms aimed at speech widely considered political propaganda. But
if blogstorms start to effectively target and silence media news and
shows considered acceptable by many Americans, governments may
move to regulate blogstorms. One option would be to regulate them un-
der the antitrust laws as conspiracies against trade.
Government, however, probably cannot regulate blogstorms without
violating the First Amendment. With a speech-inspired blogstorm, there
are free speech and free association considerations on both sides. A
410. For example, many books and organizations make this argument. Shortly before the
2004 campaign the following books and report were published: FRANKEN, supra note 35 1; JOE
CONASON, BIG LIES: THE RIGHT-WING PROPAGANDA MACHINE AND How IT DISTORTS THE
TRUTH (2003); PEw RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 319.
Liberal groups include Media Matters, supra note 44; Fairness and Accuracy in Report-
ing (FAIR), http://www.fair.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005); and Moveon.org, supra note 272.
411. For example, they believe any Democrat-no matter how virtuous, intelligent, or
competent-will be unfairly demonized in the media, while an incompetent Republican will
get a free pass. Matthew Yglesias, No, No, No, No!, http://yglesias.typepad.conmatthew/
2004/11 /nono-nono.html (Nov. 14, 2004).
412. BERNARD GOLDBERG, ARROGANCE (2003); ANN COULTER, SLANDER (2002).
413. Posting of Jfern to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/12/4/24844/
0937 (Dec. 4, 2004, 23:45 PDT).
414. Marc Cooper, Weaker Than Ever: MoveOn's State of Denial Is Bad for Democrats,




detailed analysis of the free speech implications of blogstorms is beyond
the scope of this Article. There have been detailed analyses for
traditional advocacy campaigns, and their discussions are relevant to
blogstorms.45 Many, especially in the media,1 6 feel that these forms of
private speech regulation harm the communications environment
because they can lead to less diversity of viewpoints, harm speakers and
listeners, chill media speech, and lead to less coverage of controversial
positions.4 7 Many groups may attempt to regulate in ways that would be
unconstitutional if imposed by the government. Many advocacy groups
seek content censorship, not the equal-time-type regulation the Sinclair
participants sought.4t 9 A blogstorm's spontaneity and apparent grassroots
support do not make them any better: lynch mobs were spontaneous and
had apparent grassroots support. 20 Since mainstream media are so
important for society-"news, public affairs, and entertainment
programs reflect and shape the dominant values and norms in
society" 12 -citizen groups may have a stake in determining the content,
but they should not censor such vital communication.
Those opposing private-regulatory campaigns can attempt to regu-
late them through government. Many of the campaigns' activities,
however, are clearly both constitutionally protected and generally moral.
First, informing members and others is clearly protected speech, subject
only to the usual First Amendment exceptions for defamation and con-
tent-neutral restrictions, among others. Second, using electronic bulletin
boards to say a stock is overvalued seems unobjectionable, and pro-
tected, unless there is some conflict of interest.42 Third, contacting the
415. See, e.g., Kay P. Kindred, When First Amendment Values and Competition Policy
Collide: Resolving the Dilemma of Mixed-Motive Boycotts, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (1992);
Patrick M. Fahey, Comment, Advocacy Group Boycotting of Network Television Advertisers
and Its Effects on Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 647 (1991).
416. Powell, supra note 390 ("The high pitch at which many are discussing the enforce-
ment of rules against indecency on television and radio is enough to pop an eardrum. It is no
surprise that those who make a handsome living by selling saucy fare rant the loudest-it
drives up the ratings.").
417. See Fahey, supra note 415, at 667-86. This discussion is indebted to Fahey's work.
See also BAKER, supra note 80, at 59; Volokh, supra note 3, at n.95.
418. Private individuals can regulate speech with far fewer restrictions than can the gov-
ernment, as a comparison of public and private schools would show.
419. For a discussion of content and structural regulation, see Marvin Ammori, Another
Worthy Tradition, 70 Mo. L. REV. 59 (2005).
420. Cf RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at xix.
421. See Fahey, supra note 415, at 648.
422. See Linda C. Quinn & Ottilie L. Jarmel, Securities Regulation and the Use of Elec-
tronic Media-Year 2001, in SECURITIES LAW AND THE INTERNET DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN
THE REGULATION FD ERA 293, 349 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No.
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FCC and other governmental departments is protected under the First
Amendment's right to petition. 3
Fourth, advertiser boycotts, often the "weapon of choice" by advo-424
cacy groups, are slightly more complicated. Some argue that
government can regulate advocacy boycotts subject to O'Brien/Turner
intermediate scrutiny.425 Others consider them mere instances of democ-
ratic or free market triumph. Others object that advertisers are unfairly
targeted, since they have little effect on direct programming decisions.
But even opponents of advocacy boycotts concede that such boycotts
have constitutional protection.4 27 The most important protection here may
be the right to association, as only associations and institutions could
produce noticeable regulatory results. The Supreme Court has drawn a
distinction between a peaceful political boycott, which presumptively
government cannot regulate because it is protected "expression on public
issues, 4 28 and pure economic boycott activity, regulable under antitrust
laws.42 9 As a result, a political blogstorm against a media company ap-
pears constitutionally protected.4 0 This could be the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional regulation. Where a blogstorm is
merely economic, then perhaps the government could regulate it.4 '1 Most
blogstorms, however, even those targeting all companies that give dis-
proportionately to Democrats or Republicans, will be political, not solely
BO-OOWU, 2001), WL 1258 PLI/Corp 293; Reynolds Holding, Double Whammy in Stock
Fraud Case, S. F CHRON., Nov. 9, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.con/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2003/11/09/MNGO92TRV71 .DTL.
423. Cf. BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002).
424. See Fahey, supra note 415, at 649.
425. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968); Fahey, supra note 415, at 655;
426. Of course, government can regulate third-parties to affect the targeted parties. For
example, government can impose liability on peer-to-peer computer networks for the copy-
fight-infringing activity the networks facilitated. See, e.g., Aviram, supra note 64, at 1181.
427. See Fahey, supra note 415, at 653-56.
428. NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982).
429. See id.; Fahey, supra note 415, at 651.
430. California Supreme Court deemed constitutionally protected a political boycott that
aimed to change a newspaper's editorial policies. Id. at 653 (citing Envtl. Planning & Info.
Council v. Superior Court, 680 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1984)); see also McCalden v. Cal. Library
Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that a private groups' actions that pressured
a group not to provide a forum to Holocaust-deniers could be tortious where such actions
included threats of violence).
431. Other proposals to distinguish constitutional and unconstitutional forms of private
censorship draw different lines, such as an institutional/person distinction. Even if the First
Amendment could apply to private institutions under this proposal, a blogstorm would still be
constitutionally protected. See Magarian, supra note 13.
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economic. Indeed, blogstorms apparently must have non-monetary moti-
vations.
Despite their many harms, speech-inspired blogstorms may have
some benefits. They involve both speech and association rights. They
permit individuals to affect their information environment largelyS 432Thyhliniiulcon
through market and democratic actions. They help individuals counter
what they perceive to be the negative externalities of some speech,
whether violent, indecent, or unbalanced. Finally, private speech regula-
tion is pervasive. A policy that singles out advocacy groups and
blogstorms would require a defense that distinguishes such action from
other private regulation. 33
D. Non-Media-Related Internet-Enabled Regulation
Although the focus of this paper has been internet-enabled private
speech regulation, the internet enables other collective actions analogous
to government regulation. This is natural, as governments are collective
bodies through which citizens attempt to shape their societies. One ex-
ample of non-speech action includes Net Day 96. On March 9, 1996,
without direction from an organizational staff, thousands of Californians
self-selected themselves, by location and expertise, to wire California
schools for internet access..43 Another example is privacy-regulation: ac-
tivists successfully stopped the introduction of certain software on
privacy grounds. 435 The war in Iraq has spawned several private regula-
tory initiatives, such as providing soldiers with benefits: equipment for
snipers, winter clothes for soldiers abroad , 437 and (with the coordina
tion of airlines) free airfare. 43' Boycotts are clearly popular: one site,
KarmaBanque, ranks which companies are most susceptible to con-
sumer boycotts based on whether a company's income relies on a high
volume of sales or on high margins.4 One partisan group encourages
432. See BAKER, supra note 80, at 57-60.
433. The government could likely, however, burden blogstorms through more neutral
regulation. Blogstorms depend on an unbiased, uncensored internet. Such an internet has
many qualities that may be being dismantled. For a discussion of an unbiased and uncensored
internet, see sources cited in supra note 255.
434. See, e.g., Kollock, supra note 222, at 232-34.
435. See Gurak, supra note 273, at 243-44.
436. AmericanSnipers.org, http://www.americansnipers.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
437. Gassan, supra note 10.
438. Operation Hero Miles, http://www.heromiles.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
439. Karmabanque, http://www.karmabanque.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
440. Danny Bradbury, Become an Armchair Activist, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Feb. 16, 2005,
at 10, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/science-technology/articlel 1290.ece.
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Democrats to purchase only from companies that gave campaign dona-
tions to Democrats, to reward such behavior."' Other regulatory
examples include physical swarming tactics through mobile phones for
democracy, anti-globalization, bicycle activism," 2 and private tsunami
relief."3
V. CONCLUSION
The internet provides low costs that permit ad hoc coalitions to or-
ganize online to implement private regulation through volunteer
collaboration. Groups overcome collective action problems through in-
stant loose coordination based on these costs and take action where
motivation and capacity are sufficient. Such regulation has already taken
place, especially targeted at media companies, and Americans can expect
more ad hoc private regulation in the near future. This Article takes a
first step towards understanding this emerging phenomenon.
441. See, e.g., Our Mission and Purpose, BuyBlue.org, supra note 9. This could have
unintended effects and act like campaign finance regulation. Republicans can turn to buying
Red (Republican). Although Buy Blue intends to reward companies that favor liberal and
progressive policies, along with Buy Red, the ultimate effect could be to reward apolitical
companies. Taken to the extreme, companies could opt-out en masse, effectively as though
reacting to a (potentially unconstitutional) campaign finance regulation limiting donated
money, along somewhat arbitrary lines. Or companies could opt-in and strengthen their sales
in rural areas (currently Red) or cities (currently Blue) as a result.
442. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 24, at 158; CRUMLISH, supra note 36, at 51-52.
443. Many bloggers considered the initial federal government commitment to be stingy,
posting of Armando to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.comlstory/2004/12/28/11618729
(Dec. 28, 2004, 17:18 PDT), and linked to ways to help, see id.; Posting of D. Weinberger to
Joho the Blog, http://www.hyperorg.com/blogger/mtarchive/003507.html (December 27,
2004, 14:27 EDT). Others also argued the government had been stingy. Editorial, Are We
Stingy? Yes, N.Y TiMEs, Dec. 30, 2004, at A22. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/30/opinion/
30thu2.html?incamp=article-popularjl. The government even took part in organizing private
donations. Bush, Clinton to Lead Tsunami Fund Raising, ABC NEws, http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/national/AP-Bush-Tsunami.html? (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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